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Crowdsourced Geographic Information (CGI) represents a new era in how we gather 
information, moving away from individual professionals to efforts involving the wider public 
regardless of qualification. CGI is of interest to both academics and spatial data users because 
it produces information at a rapid rate, and can be engaged to respond to events which require 
information from a changing environment. Naturally, this data is of considerable interest to 
disaster response agencies dealing with sudden events with a significant impact on known 
variables, such as where people live, or which infrastructure remains functional. At the time of 
writing, research in this field has been largely directed at overseas events, often in countries 
which have experienced events that completely overwhelmed their capacity for response. To 
this end, this study aims to fill that gap by focusing on crowdsourced research for New Zealand 
disaster response efforts, and investigates whether CGI can be beneficial here.  
This research uses interviews with key experts in the field of disaster response, and uses 
thematic analyses of these responses to generate an understanding of how CGI can be 
implemented in disaster response. Through engaging with experts from Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management, Geospatial Intelligence New Zealand, South Island iwi Ngāi Tahu, 
and the New Zealand Red Cross, this study provides a broad view of CGI in New Zealand 
disaster management and how it is understood and implemented by these agencies. 
Key findings of this study include: a need to find sources of information that can be updated 
with changing conditions; the need for a unified crowdsourced campaign to help deal with 
events; and how crowdsourcing can act as a support network for people after a disaster. This 
study presents a series of recommendations informed by expert opinions in this field and 
available literature, and which can be used as a guide towards implementing crowdsourced data 
in New Zealand. This study proposes a Citizen Response Network (CRN) framework, 
developed through the course of this research, which outlines how CGI can be successfully 
used to inform response and recovery. The CRN is designed with community engagement in 
mind to ensure the integrity of crowdsourcing as a product of citizen science.  
This thesis adds to a growing body of work examining how we engage with CGI at a variety 
of levels, and through understanding how CGI has been perceived, and used, in New Zealand 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
Recently, spatial information, and information in general, has diverged in its collection from 
being solely the domain of professionals and their agencies to include private citizens and 
unpaid volunteers. This new approach is termed crowdsourcing, and comprises part of a wider 
process termed Neogeography or Citizen Science (Goodchild, 2007). Volunteered or 
Crowdsourced Geographic Information (VGI or CGI, respectively) is any information 
collected from citizen science sources (Goodchild M. , 2007), from ordinary people sharing 
information about their world in the form of observations, social media use, to processing 
geographic information. One of the important definitions of crowdsourcing is that the person 
involved is not being paid for their efforts, and in most cases are not formally training in 
producing geospatial information. This change in data collection has transformed information 
that was previously collected in time-consuming and expensive ways, often through surveys 
and direct data creation, into a new era where information is collected in near real-time and 
sometimes at no cost to the end user (Seeger, 2008).  
 
In the field of disaster and emergency response and management, CGI is an information source 
with considerable potential to assist response agencies, especially as disaster events are 
becoming increasingly complex and consequential as a result of growing populations, 
increasing urbanisation and climate and other environmental changes. Natural events and their 
impacts on populations have been the focus of governments and international collaborations - 
the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) (UNISDR, 2018) 
is a prime example of this. The UNISDR has now adopted the Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (Prevention Net, 2018). The importance of the Sendai Framework in the 
context of this research is that information management plays a key role in reducing disaster 
impacts. By investigating how CGI can be used to better equip response efforts with reliable 
information, the aim of this project is to be part of this wider impact reduction initiative.  
 
The research presented here is primarily concerning the Response and Recovery phase of the 
‘Four Rs’. The Four Rs refer to the four stages of a disaster, in New Zealand defined as 
Reduction, Readiness, Response and Recovery (Civil Defence CDEM Framework, 2018):  
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• Reduction: Identifying and analysing long-term risks to human life and property from 
hazards; taking steps to eliminate these risks if practicable, and, if not, reducing the 
magnitude of their impact and the likelihood of their occurring. 
• Readiness: Developing operational systems and capabilities before a civil defence 
emergency happens; including self-help and response programmes for the general 
public, and specific programmes for emergency services, infrastructure lifeline utilities 
and other agencies. 
• Response: Actions taken immediately before, during or directly after a civil defence 
emergency to save lives and protect property, and to help communities recover. 
• Recovery: The coordinated efforts and processes to bring about the immediate, 
medium-term and long-term holistic regeneration of a community following a civil 
defence emergency. 
Figure 1: Disaster Management Cycle as described by CDEM (adapted from CDEM, 2018) 
 
While information collection is part of Readiness as far as developing systems that are able to 
cope with disasters, the primary focus here is Response and Recovery. The reason for this is 
that the time in which CGI would be engaged with is after an incident when information not 
previously available, such as locations of damage, is needed. Additionally, after an incident 
Recovery can benefit from information about people and their situations to inform decisions 




Although the roles CGI has played in previous events and disasters have been documented in 
the academic literature, and CGI is an active research focus in some quarters, the extent to 
which New Zealand disaster response agencies understand and are implementing this approach 
to information collection needs to be further characterised. This thesis, using a combination of 
literature review and detailed interviews with professionals working in the disaster 
management field, seeks to answer the following question: 
 
“How can Crowdsourced Geographic Information be utilised to the benefit of New 
Zealand governmental and other agencies’ responses to disasters?” 
 
This thesis addresses this questions using information from interviews with key informants 
from the following agencies/organisations, to better understand how they perceive and use 
CGI, so as to benefit to disaster response efforts: 
 
• Geospatial Intelligence New Zealand (GNZ), an arm of the New Zealand Defence Force 
(NZDF); 
• Canterbury Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CCDEM); 
• Emergency Management Otago; 
• New Zealand Red Cross (NZRC); 
• Ngāi Tahu. 
 
 
This thesis is structured in the following manner: 
 
• Chapter 2 presents a literature review of CGI that describes its definitions and origins, 
and provides examples of CGI application through a series of international case studies. 
This is followed by recent case studies from New Zealand. The literature review 
informed the development of a series of questions that were put to the aforementioned 
New Zealand disaster response agencies; the questions are presented in Appendix A. 
• Chapter 3 presents background on the Methodology used for this research, describes 




• Chapter 4 presents Key Findings from the interviews conducted with New Zealand 
disaster response agencies, including how data are managed by and transferred between 
agencies across the Four Rs. This is followed by summaries of important Themes that 
were identified from the interviews. 
• Chapter 5 presents a Discussion of how the Key Findings fit within the wider 
international and New Zealand context of CGI use in disaster response, and provides 
Recommendations for development of CGI use in this area. This includes a proposal 
for a Citizen Response Network (CRN) to harness the resources of society and official 
agencies for best developing situational awareness after a disaster. 
• Chapter 6 presents a Summary and Conclusions from this research. 
• Appendix B presents detailed synopses of the individual interviews conducted for this 
research; they constitute a rich resource for characterising institutional understanding 























Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
Crowdsourced Geographic Information (CGI) has been a focus of research over the past 
decade. For geospatial scientists, it is a novel way to approach how we gather data about the 
world. As with all sources of data, however, it is not without its drawback. Despite these 
drawbacks, the application of CGI data analysis is being increasingly used. Among these 
applications several disaster response management, the focus of this thesis. The following 
literature review provides the necessary background to understand how CGI can be applied in 
a New Zealand disaster response setting, as well as placing this research in context with 
international efforts to understand how public participation in geo-science takes place. The 
literature review is divided into three sections: 
• An introduction to CGI;  
• CGI in disaster response; and 
• A review of current research on CGI use in New Zealand disaster response. 
 
2.1. Crowdsourced Geographic Information and disaster response 
Crowdsourced Geographic Information as a concept is not new. For at least a decade, 
geographers have been considering the idea of the ‘citizen scientist’ as non-professional 
individuals or groups that record information about the world around them (Goodchild, 2007). 
While not a new concept, CGI in the context of disaster response research has become more of 
a focal point since its application in the 2010 Haitian earthquake (Zook et al, 2012). Goodchild 
(2007) posited the idea that every person living on earth has the potential to be a source of 
information when provided with a method to communicate. This idea was spurred on by 2007 
having had “an explosion of interest in using the Web to create, assemble, and disseminate 
geographic information provided voluntarily by individuals” (Goodchild, 2007). Given how 
often Goodchild’s seminal piece has been cited (3532 instances at the time of writing, Google 
Scholar) it would be fair to say that much research related to CGI would use this fundamental 
principle as a starting point. Specifically, the intersection of two ideas: ‘citizen science’ and 
‘citizens as sensors’. Citizen science is where people collectively work together in the interest 
of science or the understanding of an aspect of the world around them; as Goodchild (2007, p. 
218) phrases it: “communities or networks of citizens who act as observers in some domain of 
science”. Complementary to this is the idea of citizen sensors where people act as information 
collectors of their environment. Combined, these terms define VGI (from Sui, 2008):  
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“Digital spatial data that are produced not by individuals and institutions 
formally charged as data producers, but rather, are created by citizens who use 
communication technology to gather and disseminate their observations and 
geographic knowledge”.  
This is to say is that individuals are volunteering their time, with a wide range of backgrounds 
and skills, to create data. These can be imagined in a variety of ways from a person posting on 
social media about a broken bridge, to an individual placing a point or line to represent a feature 
on an interactive map, to large-scale groups of volunteers taking the aforementioned 
information and collating them into a crisis map in a disaster event. The core element for 
deciding if something is VGI, based on Sui’s (2008) definition, is that private citizens engage 
with the wider community to share information. 
Research in subsequent years expanded upon this initial idea through understanding the nature 
of the data in terms of quality, rate of production, and perceived reliability, as well as 
understanding the significance CGI had to the people who contributed and the groups that used 
these data. In addition to these core elements of research is how CGI can be applied practically 
to real-world problem solving, the focus of this thesis. As an additional note it is important to 
differentiate between information that comes from the public outside of the context of disaster 
response and CGI used in relation to a natural hazard threatening an area.  
 
2.1.1. Characteristics of Crowdsourced Geographic Information 
Crowdsourced Geographic Information is characterised by being created by (usually) large 
groups of untrained individuals working collectively on specific projects that are either self-
driven or directly without a for-profit motivation (Elwood, 2008). In general this represents the 
opposite of traditional or authoritative data generation and collection by trained professionals 
working alone or in small groups to create datasets on behalf of private (for profit) or 
government entities (Elwood et al., 2012). This characterisation also lends itself to five primary 
differences between CGI and traditional data collection: speed and scope of projects; ground-
level insight; community facilitation; issues around data quality and trust; and finally 
accessibility. 
The first and most noticeable feature of CGI is the range and number of people involved in 
projects. OpenStreetMap alone has 1.5 million registered users and local groups in more than 
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80 countries (Palen et al., 2015). Having groups of this size can lead to some significant 
advantages. Large user-base systems are characterised typically by fast production speeds and 
wide project scopes (Sui et al., 2012). Much of data generation is digitising or translating real-
world data to a digital form, a process that is understood commonly to be time-consuming and 
has a high reliance on human input (Goodchild and Gopal, 1989). Crowdsourced databases, at 
least in regards to those that have high memberships/users, tend to be able to bypass this 
difficulty through employing a brute force approach. By engaging large numbers of 
participants, significant quantities of data can be digitised and mapped (Meier, 2012). This is 
even more apparent when a specific focus is given, such as a natural hazard-caused or 
anthropogenic disaster, and that same processing power is concentrated on a specific area or 
task (Triglav-Cekada and Radovan, 2013; McDougall, 2012). In comparison, from my personal 
experience working in the field of geographic information science, private (and government) 
data collection agencies implement smaller teams for repurposing existing datasets, or employ 
larger teams for specific data collection at significant cost. For example, CoreLogic 
(CoreLogic, 2017), a spatial property company based in New Zealand, and implements a team 
of more than 10 people to supply and maintain their spatial property database on a full-time 
basis. In contrast, crowdsourcing can provide labour without a high cost.  
Crowdsourcing involves using the public, and as such CGI is in a unique position in that it can 
leverage local knowledge of its participants. Goodchild and Glennon (2010) make reference to 
this, saying “information obtained from a crowd of many observers is likely to be closer to the 
truth than information obtained from one observer”. Goodchild and Glennon (2010, p. 233) use 
Wikipedia as an example of this, citing it as having become an “accurate encyclopaedia”, and 
they references Giles (2005) who compared crowdsourced data in encyclopaedias. In this 
comparison Goodchild and Glennon (2010) and Giles (2005) note that ‘enthusiasts’ and 
‘amateurs’ versed in particular subjects can provide better insight due to the greater amounts 
of time and effort put into learning the subject matter (over that of a professional encyclopaedia 
maker whose attention is split amongst several entries). In contrast, traditional professional 
cartographers and analysts often need to divide their limited time over several different projects 
or areas giving a limited perspective focused around the requirements of a project (Goodchild 
and Glennon, 2010). Local knowledge can yield advantage as it can reveal information that is 
either not available to a professional or unlikely to be discovered; however it also marks 
crowdsourced data as being intrinsically tied to producer motivations. That is to say, that 
crowdsourced producers, who are not paid, will work on projects driven by personal reasons 
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(Arsanjani, 2015; Quinn, 2015; Budhathoki and Haythornthwaite, 2013; Bégin et al, 2013; 
Coleman et al, 2009; Neis and Zipf, 2012).  
Heipke (2010) examined user motivations and defined seven discrete user groups;  
1. Map lovers: a small group who produce trustable and very valuable data, also known 
as Amateur mappers.  
2. Casual mappers: Similar to Map Lovers but distinguished by the fact that they are 
only willing to spend a relatively low effort for mapping, preferring to add data over 
editing existing datasets. 
3. Experts: active people and leading map users in organisations such as mountain 
rescue, fire brigades, civil protection, or traffic guides. They are motivated by the 
feeling that they may make their own life easier, they can contribute with very valuable 
and trustworthy data, both old and new. Notably not usually considered as 
crowdsourced data producers but are likely points of interaction with CGI. 
4. Media mappers: groups of contributors, activated sporadically by regional to 
international media campaigns. Typically singular and independent event-based, 
motivations are often driven by accomplishing a specific task. In disasters, this is a 
common form of contributor group, as providing aid in a disaster provides strong 
motivation.  
5. Passive mappers: data derived from location-enabled technologies such as mobile 
phones, GPS, and social media software. These data are drawn often from contributors 
unaware of the use of their personal data or drawn from a volunteered source without 
the direct purpose of it being used for mapping (e.g. a Tweet about a disaster using used 
to locate an incident).  
6. Open mappers: Noted as the largest of all the groups, the users of this technology 
can come from any of the first four categories above, however are typically from the 
first two. This group contributes to ongoing geospatial datasets classified as open-
source, such as OpenStreetMap (OSM). Increasing attention in this category is on 
accuracy and coverage, with the datasets now rivalling existing databases such as 
Ordnance Surveys (Flanagin and Metzger, 2008; Harklay, 2010; Neis et al, 2013; 
Zielstra and Zipf, 2010). 
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7. Mechanical Turks: Individuals who conduct this kind of “volunteer” work for pay. 
Heipke (2010) notes that this group is important to include because they have large 
mobilisation powers and can be used for data validation provided accurate base 
information exists (e.g. high resolution imagery). 
These groups represent most non-professional individuals and groups that create CGI. Most 
notable is the range of skills, methods of organising, and motivations associated with these 
groups. This is important to understand as it is clear that not every source of volunteered data 
is the same, and depending on the experience and motivation of the source it is possible to 
gather very different information from different groups.  
Alongside the categorisation of different types of contributors, the impact of local knowledge 
becomes clear. This is demonstrated in the literature by the personal insight of volunteers 
improving map data. Coleman et al. (2009) term a group that does this particularly well as 
‘Neophytes’. ‘Neophytes’ are casual mappers with very little experience and motivated by an 
interest in mapping and a desire to communicate. These mappers are identified as being 
particularly useful for their local knowledge, often identifying inaccuracies in data that relate 
to where they live or have something to do with socially, economically or otherwise (Coleman 
et al., 2009). In practical terms this is exemplified in how users of OpenStreetMap map their 
local environments to a higher quality than some governmental road datasets (Arsanjani et al., 
2015; Haklay, 2010; Chilton, 2009). Arsanjani et al. (2015), Haklay (2010) and Chilton (2009), 
in their studies on OpenStreetMap, focus on the power of local knowledge in relation to 
contributors’ immediate environments. To quote Haklay (2010): “The most important value of 
VGI may lie in what it can tell about local activities in various geographical locations that go 
unnoticed by the world's media, and about life at a local level”. Chilton (2009) puts this into 
context with their study revealing that only through local knowledge was the damage of the 
United States Route 90 Bridge identified while response agencies were unaware until this was 
highlighted by a member of the public. The value of local knowledge was summarised by 
Arsanjani et al. (2015): the temporal nature of local knowledge in which only people who live 
and experience their local environments will ever truly have the most up to date and accurate 
understanding.  
CGI comes primarily from untrained individuals. This is a fact of these types of data, and 
despite some users being amateurs with good reputations most are classified as casual (Heipke, 
2010). Data from untrained casual mappers carry the risk of inaccuracies and errors that would 
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be much less likely in a professional dataset. Because of this inherent risk, CGI data quality 
has been the subject of considerable research that does not yield a clear solution to the accuracy 
issue. What is clear, however, from research examining disaster data (Goodchild and Glennon, 
2010; Poser and Dransch, 2010; Zook et al., 2010) and the data of OSM as compared with 
official state datasets in different regions (Girres and Touya, 2010; Heipke, 2010; Neis et al, 
2011), is that there is potential for high-quality information in crowdsourced datasets. Data 
quality in CGI is related to: the systems of collection and the presence of internal moderating 
mechanisms in them; the volume of participants, with higher-quality data associated with high 
contributor numbers; and contributor background and motivational groups indicating quality. 
As such, and for the purposes of the research presented in this thesis, data quality will be 
considered a factor of CGI viability in New Zealand, but not the primary concern in this area. 
Instead, this research will focus more on ‘trust’ in or perception of crowdsourced data in 
general, rather than the quality of specific CGI datasets. 
 “Trust” in this thesis refers to a held perception of quality of a type of data, specifically whether 
response agencies trust crowdsourced data enough to use it. This question of trust is significant 
as it is one of the factors in government agencies adopting CGI. Johnson and Sieber (2013) 
noted that in their experience there is initial enthusiasm around CGI implementation, however 
this is dampened by later concerns around integration and viability of data (an aspect of trust). 
Johnson and Sieber (2013) highlighted that one of the issues for governments in accepting 
‘non-expert’ data are questions of who are the contributors. Lee (2016) supported this in their 
research on integrating CGI into South Korean government data infrastructure. The 
authoritative agencies in this instance understand the benefits CGI yields, however were 
concerned at the lack of quality assurances with regards to who is producing the data. These 
two examples support the more general viewpoint presented by Goodchild (2007), Meier 
(2012) and Haklay (2010) that CGI is a powerful tool but there is a general lack of 
understanding that prohibits the same trust as is given to authoritative databases. In New 
Zealand’s case, research by Beatson (2016) indicates an element of trust in CGI from the New 
Zealand response agencies, primarily Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM), 
with the proliferation of a crisis map with strong CGI elements. This is discussed in more detail 
below, but for now it can be stated that more direct efforts are needed to gauge New Zealand 
emergency and disaster response agency perception of CGI trustworthiness. The following 
section will feature a variety of international case studies that will form a foundation of how 
CGI has been utilised overseas.  
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2.2. Crowdsourced Geographic Information in disaster response (international case 
studies) 
The previous section defined CGI and described how its elements centre on public engagement 
that can appear in differing forms. To contextualise CGI, international case studies offer a 
unique insight into how these data has been actively applied. While previous research in New 
Zealand is ideal for framing the scope and informing the findings of this current study, this 
research is relatively sparse. The following section highlights four key case studies and 
examines the lessons learned in each. These lessons will be a point of comparison for the New 
Zealand case and will better inform the New Zealand-centric research of this thesis.  
 
2.2.1. Kenyan election crisis 2007-2008 
During the period 2007 to 2008, the election for Kenya’s president caused a massive political 
crisis that was marked by protests, civil unrest and violence that left many displaced from their 
homes. This unrest stemmed from the news that Mwai Kibaki had won, a result which was 
attributed to a suspected rigging of votes (Beatson, 2016). Following the result, and ensuing 
violence, the government issued a five-day ban on reporting and the censoring of media that 
was released. This created a need for methods of communication beyond the media. Social 
media and collective information (crowdsourcing) was found to be an effective alternative. 
Central in this new method was the activist and lawyer Ory Okolloh and the ‘Ushahidi’ 
platform (Okolloh, 2009).  
On the 3rd of January 2008 Okolloh put out a call on her blog for ‘techies’ in Kenya to build a 
website for the public to communicate with. The domain registered was called Ushahidi which 
means ‘testimony’ in Kiswahili (Okolloh, 2009). This platform grew quickly and incorporated 
mobile SMS messaging into its data flows. This encouraged the participation of Kenyan 
citizens, as while many did not have access to the internet (3.2% estimated by Makinen and 
Wangu, 2008), and 50% of people had access to mobile phones, as reported by the 
Communications Commission of Kenya (Chiloba, 2012). News of this platform spread with 
even some radio stations using the reports posted on Ushahidi in their broadcasts (Okolloh, 
2009). Ushahidi allowed for the collection of anything that citizens felt like sharing, such as 
locations of violence, and notifying they had been displaced (Kahl et al, 2012). This created a 
wide spectrum of available crowdsourced data, the output of which was used by two main 
groups: response agencies and individual citizens.  
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Beatson (2016) discussed how this variety of data created good situational awareness for 
response agencies. Gao and Barbier (2011) noted that Ushahidi, for the Kenyan crisis, 
facilitated social activism and a level of public accountability to contribute to a collective 
visualisation of incidents that were used by various organisations. This level of information is 
what response agencies are looking for. In contrast to this, Ushahidi at the time was used by 
individuals for information that concerned them personally and their family. Beatson (2016) 
identified this specific personal use as ‘hotspots’: individuals sought out information around 
their local area to keep informed. This proximity to information is also fed back into the system 
by individuals close to ‘hotspots’ of violence or activity having the motivation to contribute to 
Ushahidi.  
In the application of Ushahidi for this crisis, questions of trust in these data were raised 
(Beatson, 2016; Martin-Shields and Stones, 2014; Okolloh, 2009), however this has been 
viewed as the need for improvement as opposed to a critical issue with the data. In regards to 
trust, Martin-Shields and Stones (2014) made an interesting observation that individual 
likelihood to trust crowdsourced data largely comes from who presents it, rather than 
information content itself. Specifically, Martin-Shields and Stones (2014) noted that “if 
crowdsourcing works, then our results indicate it is because of two steps. The first is that people 
share information via mobile phone; the second step is that this information is broadcast on a 
trusted medium such as radio” This raises an interesting question of how the method of 
presenting crowdsourced data to response agencies will influence their use of it.  
Kenya as a case study represents an important foundation for all research on crowdsourcing for 
disasters. This humanitarian crisis was the first major deployment of an independent project to 
collect data from the public, separate from response agencies. It also was considered a very 
successful initial deployment as it created a medium for collaboration that was in this case 
limited by either technology or media suppression (Okolloh, 2009). Okolloh supports this with 
a quote from Randy Newcomb, President and CEO of Humanity United: “In Kenya, Ushahidi 
demonstrated the power of geographically mapping real-time citizen reports and crisis-related 
information to help civilians avoid conflict”. Evident from the other case studies below, 
Ushahidi has been widely utilised. This raises the question - To what extent are response 





2.2.2. Haitian Earthquake, 2010 
On January 12, 2010, a Magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck Haiti (Beatson, 2016). This 
earthquake was a disaster at a national scale with estimates of more than 200,000 dead, 
approximately the same injured, and 2.3 million displaced (Dugdale et al., 2012). In addition 
to deaths and displacements, massive infrastructural damage severely impeded response 
efforts, with the city of Leogane having up to 90% building collapse (Heinzelman and Waters, 
2010). Within all the destruction caused by the earthquake there was one important 
infrastructure with relatively little damage: cellular phone towers, with “most towers still 
operational” (Meier and Munro, 2010, p. 92). Following the earthquake national and 
international aid was dispatched with the initial primary agency being the United States (US) 
military (Munro, 2010). Much of the local aid in the form of the 9000 United Nations (UN) 
troops under MINUSTAH (a French acronym for this UN mission), was dispersed and initially 
ineffective with their headquarters destroyed by the earthquake.  
As was the case in the Kenyan election crisis (Section 2.2.1), the initial crowdsourced data seen 
was in the form of Ushahidi SMS messages. However, the information was in Haitian Kreyol 
and most labour efforts in the first phase of CGI response were around translation, with 40,000 
messages translated in the first six weeks. In addition to Ushadidi, local infrastructure 
information was sourced through OSM but this was noted by Soden and Palen (2014) as only 
presenting a portion of the road network. The presence of situational awareness information 
(from people in need), through SMS, and infrastructure from OSM, would experience a 
dramatic evolution in the subsequent weeks. 
Ushahidi, with the aid of volunteers translating messages for its crisis map, followed a similar 
pattern as in the Kenyan election crisis, including the development of a publicly viewable crisis 
map. Yates and Paquette (2011) observed that response agencies used these data and noted that 
their systems also resembled those of ‘social media’. The Air Force Crisis Action Team 
(AFCAT) was a key agency in this, tasked with providing intelligence to US Air Force 
command. The information presented by Ushahidi was a focus point for AFCAT (Yates and 
Paquette, 2011). For the purposes of internal collaboration (excluding the citizens providing 
much of this information) Microsoft SharePoint was used, a system Yates and Paquette (2011) 
argue is ‘social’ in the way it disseminates information widely for collaborative involvement, 
including ‘on the fly’ pages being added and comment systems. A move towards both 
crowdsourced data and a crowdsourced-like method of information sharing was a noteworthy 
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feature of this case study, as it demonstrated lessons learned from public involvement. Ushahidi 
in future deployments of the platform will follow a similar pattern: a need/emergency; a small 
group activating the Ushahidi platform; a crisis map being formed alongside a public request 
for data; growth of volunteer group; and map detail as the situation develops (Yates and 
Paquette, 2011).  
Separate to Ushahidi implementation was the development, parallel to military activity, of  the 
Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team (HOT), a dispersed group of OpenStreetMap users 
focused on rapid development of spatial data post disaster (hotosm.org, 2017). As Soden and 
Palen (2014) noted, Haiti roads were not featured heavily in OSM before the earthquake and 
in response to this a more formal group within the informal OSM users was established. While 
previously existing, HOT rapidly solidified as a more structured group as a result of the tropical 
storm Ondoy in the Philippines (Maron, 2009). The impact of this focused group was 
significant, as seen in Appendix E (OSM progression with HOT intervention). In less than a 
month the OSM map of Port-Au-Prince became as detailed as Ordnance Surveys from western 
countries. This map was invaluable to response agencies because information coming from 
Ushahidi and their own responders could be located spatially with a high degree of accuracy 
(Zook et al., 2010). This form of direct mapping by the public was also demonstrated in Google 
Map place marks for important features and issues. These place marks, often contributed to by 
people internationally, were made possible by the donation of high-resolution images from 
private companies such as Google and Digital Earth. Although this type of crowdsourced 
information is beyond the scope of what formal agencies could also, it was vastly more 
effective as they required no mapping resources. 
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake there was a need to identify structural damage in 
populated areas. However there was no system to mobilise structural engineers on the ground 
to conduct structural assessment surveys, and even with individuals able to do the job there 
were not enough to work at the speed disaster response required. To this end, and with the 
release of high-resolution imagery, a community of volunteers formed to use remote sensing 
technologies (satellite imagery) in place of people on the ground. This group was the Global 
Earth Observation Catastrophe Assessment Network (GEO-CAN) (Ghosh et al., 2011). GEO-
CAN worked quickly and within 48 hours produced a map of high collapse (buildings) areas 
(Appendix F). This continued as higher resolution imagery emerged, including photos from the 
ground, resulting in even more detailed maps. These were used to assist the decision-making 
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processes of response agencies; however they were not useful to individual Haitians (Ghosh et 
al., 2011).  
This disaster also marked the novel implementation of a project called ‘Tweak the Tweet’ 
which was led by Kate Starbird (Starbird, 2011). Initially presented at the Random Act of 
Kindness workshop in 2009, the idea was to ask users on the Twitter platform to use specific 
‘Hashtags’ (an internal tagging system of ‘Tweets’) and formats for presenting critical 
information. During a disaster people could use Twitter’s own internal search Application 
Programming Interface (API) to find the messages affected people wanted to get out. With 
correct Tweet formatting these individual messages could then be translated into the Google 
Map platform. The output of this showed that few people followed the proposed format, 
however 74 users re-Tweeted posts in the correct format resulting in 3000 unique posts or calls 
for help (Starbird, 2011).  
Beatson (2016) summarised the work of three studies (Morrow et al., 2011; Munro, 2012; 
Dugdale et al., 2012) that assessed the application of Ushahidi in Haiti. They agreed that 
Ushahidi presented its data in a way that targeted response agencies by identifying ‘centres of 
gravity’ which could be used to focus resources, as opposed to individual crises and rescue 
needs. This was favourable from the response agency perspective and also worked to alleviate 
some hesitation around accuracy concerns. Dugdale et al. (2012, p. 714), in an interview with 
an emergency manager, found that individual reports were “not very accurate…up to 90% of 
the reports of people trapped…were not correct”. This contrasted with the same person’s 
comments that the aggregated information was found to be “80%...correct at the area level”. 
Agencies in the Haitian earthquake viewed CGI positively, which is supported by a special 
report by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) (Heinzelman and Waters, 2010). In this 
report it is noted that Ushahidi reports were used directly by US response agencies including 
the U.S. Federal Emergency Response Agency (FEMA), the US Marine Corps, and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development. In a Tweet from FEMA’s Craig Fugate, “the crisis map 
of Haiti represents the most comprehensive and up-to-date map available to the humanitarian 
community” (Heinzelman and Waters, 2010, p9).  
Much of the research around the Haitian earthquake focused on what can be provided by 
crowdsourced data to disaster response. The question that is absent in much of this work is how 
well do response agencies use these data. There are few articles which try to address this 
question. It is important to note that the above examples indicate a volunteer/individual driven 
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crowdsourcing effort, so the uptake of CGI by response agencies should be viewed in the light 
of information being presented to them instead of information driven by their needs.  
Resulting from the Kenyan election crisis case study (Section 2.2.1) and the evident usefulness 
of Ushahidi in that situation and in Haiti, a consequent question is: are New Zealand response 
agencies aware of its use? However even in the space two years of several new forms of 
crowdsourced data or groups working with crowdsourced data have developed, from 
Ushahidi’s crisis maps, to OSM developing and the HOT groups. This leads to a second part 
to that question: are New Zealand organisations focussing on identifying evolving forms of 
data collection or new sources becoming available? 
 
2.2.3. Chilean Earthquake 2010 
On February 27 2010, Ushahidi was activated again in Chile (Beatson, 2016). On this day, a 
Magnitude 8.8 earthquake struck causing the deaths of 521 people, with half of those being 
from the subsequent tsunami. The earthquake was located 8 km from the coastline and those 
in the closest city, Chillan, experienced a total loss of infrastructure including having no water, 
gas, sewage, electricity and unlike Haiti, no communications, with the telecommunications 
network crashing from overload of calls and SMS. This system (cellular) recovered slowly and 
was hindered notably. As this system recovered Ushahidi began to receive information and 
specific Twitter hashtags were monitored. Unlike Haiti, however, this case study had a 
powerful instance of resources being misused due to grossly incorrect information (Beatson, 
2016).  
The Ushahidi Chile crisis map was set up within 48 hours organised by Patrick Meier and 
David Kobia. Meier, who at the time was speaking at Columbia University’s School of 
International and Public Affairs (SIPA), had 60 SIPA volunteers trained by March 1st and 
working to process incoming reports. The view of Ushahidi leaders was that information would 
be largely similar to that found in Haiti, with the difference that for the Chile crisis map focus 
would not be on specific problems or issues and instead focus on information provision to 
“media organizations, civil society organisations, and Chileans about the situation from 
collapsed buildings, available food drives, and areas experiencing heightened looting” (Carlsen 
et al, 2011: from Beatson, 2016, p. 67). However, some information was used in a very direct 




During the deployment of the crisis map two reports were uploaded onto the Ushahidi platform. 
One said ‘Please send help, I am buried under rubble in my home at Lautaro 1712 Estacion 
Central, Santiago, Chile. My phone doesn’t work’. Another was from a tweet reading 
‘RT@biodome10: plz send help to 1712 estacion central, Santiago chile. Im stuck under a 
building with my child. #hitsunami #chile we have no supplies’ (Ayala 2010 from Beatson, 
2016). This was forwarded to the police by a member of the public who saw the report on 
Ushahidi. The response was significant with three fire trucks, 30 police members and the chief 
of security responding. The location turned out to be undamaged and no one was harmed. This 
hoax report highlighted two important issues; first is question of reliability of crowdsourced 
reports; the second is access to sensitive information by the public contributing or observing. 
Research on the subject does note however the benefits public access to information and 
communication has, particularly in regards to Twitter use during the Chilean earthquake 
(Ayala, 2010, from Beatson, 2016).  
Twitter has been featured in the literature regarding the Chilean earthquake. This research 
however concerns primarily post-event analysis of Tweets and their potential application over 
actual use examples. One such paper, Ahmed and Sargent (2014), examined how Twitter was 
used as a communication tool in this disaster. Their findings suggest that amongst 500 tweets 
analysed there was a clear trend towards individual community members being the most 
prolific Tweeters. Furthermore Ahmed and Sargent (2014) found that the 140 character limit 
in Tweets resulted in concise messages that combined with attached images/URLs delivered 
effective information. They also found that very few senders of Tweets during this period were 
from official agencies. This lack of involvement from official agencies such as the Ministry of 
National Defence suggests that during this period there was limited engagement of the 
community and response agencies via Twitter. Finally, Ahmed and Sargent (2014) examined 
in their study how Twitter was used amongst the community for communicating/organising 
tasks. While they did not mention specific tasks undertaken, Ahmed and Sargent (2014) noted 
the way in which re-Tweeting information allowed for rapid dissemination of Tweets relating 
to specific problems. These authors characterised Twitter as a net positive influence on 
recovery after a disaster. This positive viewpoint on non-emergency responses (those that do 
not pose imminent risk to life) is supported by Beatson (2016) in her analysis that identified 
Radio Bio-Bio as a key user of crisis maps to support local community operations, in this 
instance helping source potable water.  
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In contrast to the example of the crisis map being misused, Twitter response to people in danger 
was noted by one pair of authors as yielding an unequivocally positive result. Paris and Rubin 
(2013) followed a case study of a missing British couple and the mobilisation of cooperative 
efforts over Twitter and the internet to assist in finding them. A family member of one of the 
couple engaged with Twitter seeking aid in finding their location post-earthquake. The outcome 
of these efforts was good, as the couple was found shortly after these efforts began. Paris and 
Rubin (2013) also note that this case study highlights different technologies and websites that 
assist in locating people after a disaster such as Facebook’s ‘check in’ system, Google Person 
Finder, and even Couchsurfing.org are used, and indeed were used in finding this couple. This 
highlighted that although direct information can be misused, it can also produce outcomes that 
are noteworthy testaments to what social media can do to link and mobilise people.  
In the above studies a consistent theme is present: the pervasive risk of being burdened by 
either incorrect, irrelevant or too much information. Cobo et al. (2015) sought to solve this 
through technology and the automatic classification of Tweets for relevance. Cobo et al. (2015) 
used Chile as a sample for this in assessing their application named ‘Citizen Channel’. Related 
work identified by Cobo et al. (2015) began with manual classification of information. This is 
what crisis mapping mostly involved as teams of volunteers worked to process data, however 
clear limitations including language barriers and large datasets were a constant. Further detailed 
post-processing, or secondary information such as patterns amongst datasets are also examined 
by Cobo et al. (2015). The examination of metadata, such as where is information coming from, 
and looking for areas of data concentration as an indication of need, an element that has 
application to disaster response as finding patterns can indicate where resources can most 
affectedly help people. Finally, research on creating tools to process and view these data live 
in a real situation was also examined. This analysis of data through software may offer 
solutions to the issue with massive datasets posed by crowdsourcing through social media 
(Cobo et al., 2015)  
The 2010 Chilean earthquake provided insights to the impact social media can have on disaster 
response, and two possible outcomes of using crowdsourced data; successful direct response 
and misappropriation of crucial resources. Both stem from social media being a staple in how 
people communicate after a disaster. Citizen engagement through social media yields positive 
results, although direct intervention needs further investigation. However the potential amount 
of CGI is immense and this could act as a deterrent to response agencies actively engaging with 
the public over these platforms. There are solutions to managing high data volumes but these 
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appear to have only recently been applied to CGI and this poses an interesting question: are 
New Zealand response organisations aware of and able to implement new technologies to aid 
use of CGI? 
 
2.2.4. The 2011 Queensland Floods, Australia 
Between December 2010 and January 2011 an unprecedented amount of rainfall occurred in 
Queensland, Australia (Bureau of Meteorology, 2011; from Beatson, 2016). The impact of this, 
in the words of the Bureau, was ‘one of the most widespread and significant floods in 
Queensland’s history’. A Flood Emergency was declared during this period in response to 
damage and the loss of 38 lives (Beatson, 2016). This event differed from situations above 
where the onset of emergencies and the speed of response efforts would differ greatly based on 
location and when during the floods it occurred. For instance Toowoomba, an area in south 
eastern Queensland, experienced flash flooding to the degree that waterborne debris included 
vehicles (Bruns et al. 2012; from Beatson, 2016). Toowoomba was not isolated in this and a 
number of locations were also struck suddenly. For this event, while flooding occurred over 
the entire period, the focal point of crowdsourced data was on Twitter between the 10th to 16th 
of January 2011, with 11,600 Tweets featuring the Hashtag #qldfloods on the 12th January 
alone at the height of the flooding (Beatson 2016), as well as a Ushahidi based crisis map 
launched by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) organisation.  
Compared to the events in Kenya, Haiti and Chile (Sections 2.2.1-2.2.3), the unique elements 
of the Queensland flood concerned who was responsible for creating and disseminating the 
crowdsourced crisis map, how research characterised social media as an accelerator of public 
service information, and how photographic evidence of damage and flooding was used to 
derive trustworthy reports and even a digital spatial model of the flooding. As discussed in the 
case study of Kenya, some of the trust in crowdsourced data comes from who it is presented 
by. The Queensland Floods provide insight into how a reputable agency, in this case a media 
organisation, could impact agency perception of crowdsourced data. 
Posetti and Lo (2012, cited in Beatson, 2016) discussed the timeline and approach the ABC 
television network took in producing their Ushahidi platform crisis map. From the outset the 
crisis map produced was not actually created with the floods in mind. It was instead a trial for 
the ABC to map feral animal sightings with possible secondary functions to map and display 
emergency and news story information. Because of this Ping Lo, as well as the ABC’s national 
20 
 
social media coordinator, noted that the map was produced with what she termed as a ‘talkback 
[radio] caller’ mind-set. This is to say that it was an open platform for introduction of 
information. The platform was used to publish information that could not be verified 
immediately but represented enough public interest to justify reporting on, with appropriate 
caveats attached to this information.  
ABC’s crisis map attracted significant attention with 1500 reports being submitted over its 
lifespan. These reports, particularly those from the public comprising one third of all reports, 
were aided by being categorised from the outset as to whether they were property and road 
damage, power outages, and sewage spills. Ross and Potts (2011, from Beatson, 2016) noted 
additionally that ABC  displayed more ‘stationary’ and verified information from official 
sources (such as Queensland State Emergency Service) allowing the crisis map to serve as a 
source of information to the same people providing information useful to response agencies. 
This synergistic relationship between the community who knew the ground situation and 
needed information about services, and response agencies who wanted to communicate 
emergency information and needed to know what areas were in danger, presents an interesting 
question: have New Zealand response agencies considered the use of social media or platforms 
such as crisis maps as a way to create a constructive dialogue, between CGI providers and 
official agencies, during emergencies?  
Disseminating information effectively to the public during a crisis can be just as important as 
collecting information. To this end, Professor Axel Bruns of the University of Queensland 
worked with several other researchers, across three papers (Bruns et al, 2012; Bruns and 
Burgess, 2013; Bruns, 2014), to understand the role Twitter had in the Queensland disaster. 
Their findings highlighted the highly effective nature of the Twitter platform for spreading 
information, as well as the use of embedded images in Tweets for understanding the situation 
in affected areas. Additionally Bruns et al. (2012) found that response agency involvement on 
social media during this period was high, in contrast to previous case studies where response 
agencies were not as involved.  
A report by the Centre of Excellence for Creative Industries and Innovation examined the role 
social media environments had on effective communication in crisis situations (Bruns et al, 
2012). Specifically, they looked at Tweets under the #qldfloods Hashtag. The report found  that 
Twitter in the Queensland floods supported community empowerment through locals being 
able to stay connected and informed, while also noting that their findings were centred around 
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populated areas and this implies there may be people who are missed in social media CGI 
(Bruns et al., 2012). The report also noted significant involvement of response agencies on 
social media with ‘emergency services…amongst the most visible participants in #qldfloods’. 
This deviated from the previously established norm of response agencies observing the outputs 
of crowdsourced data collection with greater distance and less involvement. One possible 
reason for this change is the direct involvement of Queensland police in the social media 
crowdsourcing effort under the Twitter handle @QPSMedia (Queensland Police Service Media 
Unit). This direct involvement helped recovery through improved information flows both 
ways, notably having each Tweet by @QPSMedia being re-Tweeted 25 times on average. 
Twitter, and social media as a wider category, represent an emerging form of communication. 
As such it would be appropriate to ask New Zealand agencies: how do they engage with social 
media and how this has changed over time?   
 
2.3.1. Crisis Maps and data collection – the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, 
New Zealand 
In simple terms a crisis map is any map that appears after a disaster and displays content 
specifically for parties concerned with the ground-level situation (Beatson, 2016). To this end 
Beatson (2016) provides a detailed account of the creation, and consolidation, of crisis maps 
after the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake:  
“The Christchurch Recovery Map (eqnz.co.nz) was launched within 24 hours of 
the earthquake (McDougall 2012: 207). Initially three maps with overlapping 
objectives were deployed by the organisations Eagle Technology Group, a 
community volunteer group based in Wellington (using the Ushahidi platform) 
and Stuff (a news service under the Fairfax Media group); and it was only after 
negotiation that one map was agreed upon to ‘maximise efforts and reduce 
duplication’ (McDougall 2012: 207). The Christchurch Recovery Map was run 
entirely by volunteers with the majority of members based in Wellington (Forde 
2011), but with international participation from over seven different countries.” 
Beatson (2016) describes a situation in which multiple crisis maps were established and some 
disestablished within a very short space of time. The variety of maps is important because they 
demonstrate the range of producers involved. For example, one producer, Eagle Technology, 
is a large company with significant resources and paid staff, while the community volunteer 
22 
 
map is the opposite with limited resources and a higher time cost to individuals working on the 
maps. While producers differed, their goals intersected in wanting to help understand what has 
happened in the disaster and to present that information to agencies and the public. The 
challenge is to identify where these groups intersect.  This diversity is a key theme presented 
in Beatson’s (2016) work, as is the overcoming of institutional differences to produce a unified 
information portal of public use. 
The crisis maps in Christchurch acted as a primary source of information for both Emergency 
Management Offices (EMO) and the public. A centralised information source in this case acted 
as a factor improving situational awareness of all users. Beatson (2016) describes how the 
disruption from the earthquake created a ‘New Normal’ (Taylor 2011, cited in Beatson, 2016). 
This new normal refers to the removal of base utilities and communications caused by the 
earthquake, as well as the disruption to everyday activities such as work. As such residents of 
Christchurch, and their family and friends wanting to know more about their situation, quickly 
became information-dependant for even the most basic services such as where to get water. 
This need for information was met with another issue: traditional sources such as news media 
(often daily papers) were, when even available, filled with rapidly outdated information that 
was too broad for practical use. This lack of information drove the need for new sources of 
information much more specific and designed specifically to support situational awareness for 
residents and response planners. Crisis maps fill this gap by giving an avenue for information 
on a local scale, like sources of food, water and shelter. Information such as this had real and 
tangible value to residents and allowed planners to get a ground level understanding of the 
situation. Furthermore because much of this information was being provided by the residents 
it was specific and directed to individual families’ needs.  
Situational awareness is a key determinant of the success of strategic planning for large EMOs 
and local community response. Beatson (2016) along with Paton et al. (2014) discuss this for 
the Christchurch event. This is referred to in Beatson’s (2016) work as the ‘self-organising 
capability of communities’ and is related to the idea of community resilience. A summary of 
this concept states resilience as “the ability of a system, community or society exposed to 
hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard” (UNISDR, 
2009, from Beatson, 2016). Strategic information is an important part of resilience as was 
discovered. With accurate and timely information local communities can more effectively 
come together to find solutions to problems posed by a disaster. For example crisis maps were 
noted as being a good aid to community based resilience by being a primary information source 
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(Beatson, 2016). Paton et al. (2014) note that in the aftermath of a disaster factors like isolation 
and loss of social media have a significant impact on individual resilience, and that 
communities coming together has a large impact on the welfare of people, further highlighting 
the critical nature of information in a disaster.  
Community engagement takes more than one form such as groups of coordinated volunteers, 
the general participation of locally affected persons, and time-donating dispersed volunteers 
who are not directly affected. This is particularly important when it comes to the connection 
between crisis maps and social media information. During the earthquake the Twitter hashtag 
#eqnz, alongside competing hashtags such as #nzquake and #christchurch, were widely used 
(Beatson, 2016). The use of hashtags in social media created a point of communication that 
could be used in Christchurch and New Zealand, and across the world. This communication 
created a two-sided system: a dialogue for individuals to talk about the event, and also a source 
of information for affected persons/EMOs to gain situational awareness. In the case of the 
Christchurch crisis map, social media created a direct link to notify the crisis map 
administrators of important issues or developments. This link through social media 
complemented the use of SMS communication and direct contact with the EQNZ website 
(Beatson, 2016). An important note around this observation was the need for a volunteer base 
to process this information, with much of the processing being done by volunteers in 
Wellington, New Zealand. Yin et al. (2012) discuss this in a post event study implementing a 
Twitter monitoring system that filters based on the use of keywords. The output of their 
investigation are visualisations of geotagged data that show issues of importance by volume. 
Although arguments can be made around methods of data collection and the impact it has on 
different groups (particularly those with restricted access to technology), this form of collection 
is a good case study for the integration of indirect information into crisis map systems. 
A study of social media in disaster response was also undertaken by Glenerter and Mushegian 
(2011) using Christchurch as a case study. Rather than looking at this from the perspective of 
community engagement, they examined the nature of how people communicate and how that 
relates to difficulties in taking bulk data to form situational awareness. This work also looked 
at location analysis when the crowdsourcing is without geo-tagging. Across this research it was 
identified that existing software available for text analysis, specifically the Stanford’s NER 
(Name Entity Recognition) software, can have issues with syntax. Changes in capitalisation, 
use of improperly placed symbols, or misspelling of words, can have an impact on automatic 
identification of samples. This is a factor for consideration of any proposed system of social 
24 
 
media data information into a crisis map. Secondly the research examined the capability to find 
the physical location of reference in a given social media post. This is done through analysis 
of location-referring words in tweets to narrow down a location. Geo-parsing, as it is called, 
can yield its own crisis maps of Twitter message locations. These data however are recognised 
as having high variability in quality and the question of its application in a live situation needs 
further investigation. Glenerter and Mushegian (2011) highlight the technical hurdle agencies 
will face in trying to integrate crowdsourced data.  
When establishing any map which will be used by people in critical situations, the quality of 
data is of the utmost importance (Glenerter and Mushegian, 2011). As discussed earlier in this 
literature review, methods of quality assessment vary but all ultimately aim to achieve the same 
goal; verification of crowdsourced data. Beatson (2016) addressed this in the context of the 
Christchurch earthquake. To paraphrase, verification is a complex task that involves 
investigating (moderating) volunteered information for usability. As such the verification 
procedure was actually undertaken remotely in Wellington through ‘face-to-face collaboration’ 
and aided by training from experienced members of the volunteer team. Applicable lessons 
from this verification process included the importance of proper training and accountability 
procedures, in this case user identifications and password-protected moderation systems. Using 
the shared workspace in Ushahidi software, inbound information flows could be moderated for 
publishable suitability. Beatson (2016) wrote positively about the act of verification as it allows 
for a “flexible, self-directed, and synchronized….division of tasks” that aids the process of 
getting information out to the public. Beaton (2016) also remarked however that further 
research is needed on the ability of labour intensive moderating processes to scale with 
information surges during a disaster cycle, while maintaining the quality seen in this volunteer 
group’s work.  
For the discussion around elements of a crisis map there is one final question, and arguably the 
most important: Is it effective? This question posed for crisis maps in this form has significance 
as it is the primary example in New Zealand of using CGI to try to address and ease the harm 
caused by disasters. Across Beatson’s (2016) work the question is consistently redirected to 
this idea of can it be used, and how it can help? To this extent Beatson (2016) found that crisis 
maps have been effective for response in the 2011 Christchurch earthquake. The output of crisis 




2.3.2. Interagency adoption of Crowdsourced Geographic Information and community 
cooperation  
Data from crowdsourcing creates new possibilities for responding to the negative impacts of 
disasters, and while this is the subject of academic research and debate it is a logical conclusion 
that data without systems to translate it into meaningful action is meaningless information. To 
that end this section addresses whether crowdsourced data can benefit New Zealand disaster 
response through response agencies engaging with the data. In addition, the degree to which 
agencies share data amongst themselves and the communities impacted by a disaster will also 
be addressed.  
Dantas and Seville (2006) investigated the issues associated with implementing information 
sharing networks from an organisational perspective. Information sharing in this instance is the 
formal infrastructure for data sharing in an effective and timely manner. Dantas and Seville 
(2006) use another New Zealand disaster event, the 2005 Matata flooding event. This event 
was characterised partially by considerable interference/damage to public roading 
infrastructure, and the paper was written from a public roading agency viewpoint. Dantas and 
Seville (2006) concluded that interactions between the agencies involved created a need for an 
‘intra organisation data sharing’ network. Specifically, during the disaster two agencies 
(Transit NZ – transport infrastructure; and Telecom – a telecommunications company) 
experienced very different periods between the disaster occurring and having a situational 
overview of the damage done to their networks. Transit NZ local consultants were activated to 
assess road damage, and did so through reports from the public and a helicopter survey that 
combined created a situational overview more than 12 hours after the initial weather reports. 
In comparison, Telecom through their Road Assessment Maintenance Management (RAMM) 
system used technological sensors to identify points of network damage. The result of this was 
a full restoration of Telecom’s network within a few hours of the disaster. Dantas and Seville 
(2006) argued that if Transit NZ had access to the RAMM network they would have had almost 
immediate situational awareness and could have started restoring roads before the disaster had 
finished its course. This finding raises an interesting question around what technologies disaster 
response agencies currently use and if these are shared for mutual benefit.  
Beyond government-mandated and professional response organisations exist volunteer 
community groups. Beatson (2016) refers to these as ‘emergent citizen groups’ and takes a 
definition from Stallings and Quarantelli (1985: 94): 
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[citizen emergent groups are] groups that can be thought of as private citizens 
who work together in pursuit of collective goals relevant to actual or potential 
disasters but whose organization has not yet become institutionalized … Such 
groups are considered emergent in two respects: the relationship among the 
individuals pursuing the collective goals is new (the group has an internal 
structure that did not exist before) and the tasks being undertaken in pursuit of 
these goals are new for individuals so joined. In its purest form an emergent 
group has a new structure (i.e., social relations) and a new function (i.e., goals 
and tasks). 
These groups were identified in the Christchurch case study. Specifically the team who 
produced the Christchurch Recovery Map, while involving open source professionals, were a 
previously unformed group who came together as citizens working for a common goal. This 
definition also extends to local level community groups that form in a post disaster 
environment, providing food, shelter and, significant to this investigation, information, to the 
public (Beatson, 2016). These groups and their interaction with official agencies will change 
the degree to which their outputs, such as crisis maps, will be shared and adopted.  
The interaction between official agencies and the community overseas has been discussed by 
Beatson (2016). Beatson references Okolloh (2009) and Morrow et al. (2011), using the 
disasters of the Kenyan 2008 election and the Haitian earthquake respectively. In the Kenyan 
example there was a distinct hesitation by formalised agencies to adopt and trust this emergent 
form of data. Specifically the NGOs that were invited to map the civil unrest “[did] not appear 
to want to embrace this form of citizen reporting [an established Ushahidi map]” (Okolloh 
2009: 69). In contrast to this Morrow et al. (2011) concluded in their examination of the Haiti 
earthquake (that used the same platform and system) that there was “concrete and convincing 
evidence of official emergency management organisations finding value in the data produced 
by this emergent deployment to support the ‘situational awareness for strategic, operational 
and tactical organizations’” (Morrow et al. 2011, from Beatson, 2016). The situation in New 
Zealand during the Christchurch earthquake appears to exhibit elements from these contrasting 
examples.  
When the Christchurch Recovery Map was implemented it featured cooperation from both 
volunteers, the private sector, and academic institutions. Primarily a volunteer-run initiative, 
telecommunication companies including Telecom, Vodafone, and 2 Degrees provided support 
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with phone communications. This enabled volunteers to communicate at distance easily which 
was of particular importance as a large part of the volunteer workforce was based in Wellington 
from the Victoria University of Wellington (VUW). VUW provided rooms for volunteers to 
meet, work and organise to produce this map. This support from private and academic 
institutions did not however mitigate the concerns around applying a volunteer crisis map. 
Concerns primarily related to what information was coming from central agencies such as Civil 
Defence, and what was from the general public (with implication that public data had 
inaccuracies). Beatson (2016) noted that an attempt was made to differentiate and understand 
this information however was not done within the time frame of the event. This has 
implications for future crisis maps, as without support and implementation crisis maps cannot 
be effective.  
This contention between volunteer organisations and the formal response agencies centres on 
the structure of response called the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS). This 
system is the physical and software systems that exist to allow agencies to coordinate their 
resources. Beatson (2016) and a report by McLean et al. (2012) noted that what is absent from 
this system is a method of liaising with volunteer organisations, or at least groups that develop 
in response to a disaster. Of significance is that in McLean’s (2012) report one of the major 
findings was that “new structures be developed to modify CIMS so as to better link the response 
to emergencies with the community and community organisations” (McLean et al. 2012: 202). 
A positive drawn from this is that the Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency Management 
(MCDEM) released a corrective action report (MCDEM 2012) which agreed with this 
conclusion. Community groups do not exist in isolation, and often experience direct 
interactions with traditional response agencies.  
Civil Defence, in this instance, was generally supportive of volunteers producing a product for 
public good. Particularly as it was directly supported by a reputable academic organisation. 
However contention for the project centred on what data was used in the final product. This 
implies that the data from people at ground level, the public and community groups, was not 
accepted or at least not utilised formally in 2011. The outcomes of these interactions are of 
critical importance for future applications of crowdsourced data, because community groups 






The main considerations for this thesis from this literature review are the following: 
• Crowdsourced Geographic Information represents a form of data that is both emerging 
and has the potent to change how we look at data collection as professionals. 
• Disaster response requires up-to-date information as responders make decisions based 
of damage caused and its impact to populations. 
• Crowdsourced Geographic Information in disaster response has its roots in Ushahidi, a 
form of CGI that started in Kenya to help people communicate during a period of civil 
unrest. 
• Crowdsourced Geographic Information in disaster response can be direct and indirect: 
o Direct: legacy datasets (OpenStreetMap) and response datasets (TomNod 
satellite image viewing effort). 
o Indirect: Social media collection. 
• Lessons from international case studies: 
o Crowdsourced Geographic Information efforts can both aid local governmental 
response and can be in conflict with this. 
o People have an incredible capacity to contribute and this has been capitalised 
by some crowdsourced projects, particularly OpenStreetMap with their HOT 
initiative.  
o Local spatial information tends to improve after a disaster. 
o Distance of volunteers from a particular incident has minimal impact with many 
crowdsourcers using remote information (typically imagery) to produce data. 
This however is not the case for CGI on population/welfare impacts, which still 
need to come from those affected on the ground.  
• New Zealand studies are limited and have focused on specific events/responses.  
o There is a need for a study from a wider perspective that looks at how 
crowdsourcing could be used across the entire response system.  
• In New Zealand the primary application of crowdsourcing was through three crisis 
maps developed during the 2011 Christchurch earthquakes. Lessons from this can be 






















Chapter 3 – Methodology 
 
3 Methodology overview  
The methodology focuses on thematic analysis of interviews with key informants from a 
selection of New Zealand’s disaster relief organisations. To create the method outlined below, 
three primary texts were used for reference: The SAGE Encyclopaedia of Social Science 
Research Methods (Lewis-Beck et al, 2004); Qualitative Research Practice – A guide for Social 
Science students and researchers (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003); and Qualitative Research Methods 
for Social Sciences, 5e (Berg, 2004).  
The research in this thesis follows the responses of key informants as they discuss their 
involvement (from a GIS perspective) in disaster response. These responses are shaped by a 
series of questions designed to address the research topic of “How can Crowdsourced 
Geographic Information be utilised to the benefit of New Zealand governmental and other 
agencies’ responses to disasters?” The questions (presented in appendix A) provided the 
framework for semi-structured interviews addressing these topics: 
 
● The organisation’s involvement in disaster response operations. 
● How the organisation uses GIS and spatial data in disaster response. 
● The informants’ experience around the use of CGI. 
● The informants’ ideas as to how crowdsourced data might be used in the future. 
With information from these topics, thematic analysis was conducted to develop an 
understanding of how CGI can be used in New Zealand.  
 
3.1. Interview design 
The interviews themselves are designed around the principles outlined in the SAGE 
encyclopaedia (Lewis-Beck et al, 2004) and Ritchie and Lewis’s (2003) chapter on in-depth 
interviews. There are three primary methods of interviewing subjects in social science: 
structured, unstructured, and semi-structured interviews.  
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Structured interviews use a rigid set of questions, accompanied by a set of instructions for the 
interviewer on how best to pose questions that are designed to have specific answers. The goal 
of these questions is to get definitive answers to queries that have little variation in phasing of 
response. Generally, structured interviews are used for research questions that will use 
statistical analysis of respondents’ answers; political polls would fall into this category. In 
structured interviews, direct questions are needed to remove ambiguity in results. However for 
much of social science research, this is not applicable as the questions posed are more nuanced 
and look to provide data that leads to new understandings.  
Unstructured interviews often use a respondent-led approach that employs open-ended 
questions to collect as much information as possible. This type of interview is used either to 
help develop a question by asking something like “what issues are important to your 
community,” or to collect stories and experiences as part of narrative study. With both 
structured and unstructured approaches there are benefits and drawbacks. Structured interviews 
collect good data around a specific question, while unstructured interviews allow for discovery 
and can address questions around experience and perception. 
The dichotomy between structured and unstructured interviews makes neither approach 
suitable for answering the question of the experience around using a particular type of data 
such as CGI. A solution to this is to use semi-structured interviews. As described by Lewis-
Beck et al. (2004), a semi-structured interview focuses around a series of topics or points to be 
covered. However, the way in which the questions for these topics are asked is left for the 
interviewer to decide. Additionally, a provision is made in semi-structured interviews for both 
open ended questions that can discover previously unconsidered topics, and impromptu 
questions that elaborate on these topics. Importantly, the semi-structured interview process 
allows for iterative exploration of ideas that emerge as the data collection proceeds. 
Accordingly, semi-structured interviews were conducted for this research, based on the set of 
questions provided in Appendix A. 
 
3.2. Participant Recruitment 
Interview participants were recruited from three organisations: Geospatial Intelligence New 
Zealand (GNZ), an arm of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF); representatives from 
Canterbury Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CCDEM) and Emergency 
Management Otago; the New Zealand Red Cross (NZRC); and South Island iwi Ngāi Tahu. 
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These organisations provide primary response to disasters that are of interest to New Zealand, 
both domestically, and in the Pacific region. While there are a variety of other agencies that 
respond to disasters, the above organisations were selected because they contribute to the 
planning and intelligence operations that concern the use of geographic information; in the case 
of Ngāi Tahu, they have extensive experience in engaging with communities during and after 
the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. The participants were invited based on the 
following criteria; direct involvement in some aspect of disaster response; direct involvement 
into GIS data collection and analysis; manage teams that create spatial intelligence; and input 
into organisational strategy concerning the use of crowdsourced data. 
Once candidate organisations and personnel within them were identified, they were approached 
initially to determine their willingness to participate in this research. When positive assent was 
gained, a formal procedure was initiated through the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee and the University of Canterbury Ngāi Tahu Research Centre to have the proposed 
research vetted for appropriateness, and to ensure participant confidentiality. Please see 
Appendix C and D, respectively, for the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee 
and Ngāi Tahu Research Centre approval letters.   
 
3.3. Thematic Analysis 
The information gained from semi-structured interviews was then subjected to thematic 
analysis. As described by the SAGE encyclopaedia (Lewis-Beck et al, 2004), thematic analysis 
is the process of finding themes and sub-themes within responses made by research 
participants. These responses are to questions and prompts from an interviewer as a research 
question is explored. The outcome of this exploration was themes and sub-themes that provide 
a higher level of understanding than the participants were able to generate as individuals. There 
are two types of thematic analysis; context and narrative (Lewis-Beck et al., 2004). Contextual 
analysis looks at a body of text to understand the core themes that define its perspective. 
Narrative analysis looks at analysing a range of participants for common linking themes. This 
study used both as it attempted to understand how each organisation deals with the issue of 
crowdsourced data, while also piecing together what New Zealand’s disaster operations’ 
perspectives on this data are. The key topics through the interviews are: 
• What the organisation’s involvements in disaster response operations were (with a 
focus on GIS contribution); 
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• how they used GIS and spatial data for disaster response; 
• what their experience working with crowdsourced data has been; 
• what future user-potential applications do the informants foresaw.  
These four topics generated an understanding of the current and potential use of crowdsourced 
data use in the New Zealand disaster response arena.  
 
3.4. Result structure 
The interviews conducted during this thesis, being in-depth and from authoritative sources, 
need to be documented as a series of answers to specific questions/topics. This is to say that 
the contribution from each participant is very important and needs to have their viewpoints on 
each question noted. This forms a base layer of information for the reader to understand how 
the participants view elements of the question of ‘how crowdsourced data can be used in 
disaster response work’. Further to this is a record of the different themes participants presented 
in their interviews. These individual response results form Part One: Participant Interviews and 
Responses. Part Two: Organisational Perspectives, collates this data by the organisation each 
interviewee represents. This will enable the grouping of themes consistent across respondents 





Chapter 4 – Key Findings 
The key findings from interviewing New Zealand disaster response agencies, and Ngāi Tahu, 
are presented below. Also presented are figures showing the flows of data and information 
between agencies and organisations based upon this research and the literature.  
 
4.1 Data flows between agencies, and types of data used 
 
Figure 2 outlines how information flows for national level response organisations work. The 
black lines represent organisational hierarchy, while the yellow lines represent disaster event 
specific information flows. At a macro level, this diagram represents how information is 
collected from ground level, and is disseminated up from local to national headquarters to be 
analysed, and then re-disseminated back down to response workers in the form of situation 
reports. Important elements to note include; a strong association between NZRC and CDEM 
that persists at all levels; NZDF to CDEM engagement being conducted at an HQ level; Red 
Cross to NZDF engagement happening with CDEM as an intermediary through CDEM 
generated situation reports; and all of the flows are framed with Reduction and Readiness being 
more heavily engaged with by HQ level branches, with Response and Recovery being of 
greater concern to local branches and first responders. 
  
Figure 3 expands on Figure 2 by identifying each source of the information flow and how each 
agency uses this in relation to reduction, readiness, response and recovery. Figure 3 shows non-
crowdsourced (or traditional) sources of data. The trends this figure are; data collection is 
primary focused on response efforts with the readiness and recovery efforts next more frequent; 
CDEM and NZDF are large consumers of all information (connected to their national mandate 
to manage events on behalf of the government), while Red Cross consumes more ‘active’ 
information that is event specific. Beyond the process depicted in this diagram, reduction and 
readiness efforts use data developed over a long period, including private data acquisition and 
analysis from this informing response plans; response information has a more widespread 
approach of taking information from almost any and every source; Red Cross engages, at an 
information level, with more response based work and uses internal/EOC information to inform 




Figure 4 shows how these agencies have dealt with crowdsourced data up to the present and 
where future sources are planned. Again, there is a clear differentiation between reduction to 
readiness, and response to recovery stages, with the latter being significantly more information 
heavy. Crowdsourced data from the interviews was categorised as, part of an organisations’ 
policy (P), policy but infrequent (I) and developed future plans (F). Within these categories, 
social media and public-agency communication form the bulk of this information, and are 
clearly a well-developed source at this time. A greater focus on crowdsourced data for recovery 
as opposed to non-crowdsourced data; OpenStreetMap is not heavily used in New Zealand and 
even for NZDF this is primarily an overseas activity; at present only one agency has a 













Figure 4. Crowdsourced data streams used by New Zealand disaster response agencies, classified by the Four Rs.
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4.2 Interview Question Summaries (By Organisation) 
As the questions given to the participants (3.1.2.) were designed to create a flow of dialogue, 
this section breaks down the extensive questionnaire into six (6) key points which summarise 
each organisation’s views:  
1. Function: 
What function does their agency have in relation to New Zealand disaster response 
operations, i.e. their scope, and level of technical GIS work?  
2. Information Use: 
What information is used by the agency; what are the limitations of this information; 
and what do they value most in information used for disaster response? 
3. Crowdsourcing: 
How does the organisation define crowdsourcing, and how does crowdsourcing 
currently fit into operations? 
4. Limitations: 
From their understanding of crowdsourced data, did the interviewees perceive any 
flaws or limitations of crowdsourced data? 
5. Future Plans: 
What is the future direction of the interviewees’ agency regarding information 
collection for disaster response?  
6. Relationships: 
How do the interviewees view the relationship between their agency and external 
volunteer groups regarding the handling of data for disaster response? 
 
4.2.1. Civil Defence Emergency Management Interview Summary 
1. Function: 
Civil Defence Emergency Management is a government organisation which acts under 
the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management. As such, CDEM is the 
primary responder to disasters at all levels, from national emergencies involving 
Cabinet and the Prime Minister’s Office, to regional and local events which employ 
CDEM in EOCs near the event site. CDEM is involved from strategic planning to 
ground level implementation working alongside other agencies. From a technical GIS 
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standpoint, CDEM uses the ESRI suite with an increasing focus on online portals.  
 
2. Information Use: 
As noted in Figure 3, CDEM uses different sources of information at each different 
stage of the disaster response cycle. CDEM’s Reduction and Readiness efforts are 
directed towards understanding the risks posed to people before an event takes place. 
Due to this focus, much of the information is technical in nature, and examines risk 
factors such as population demographics, local topography, and models of event 
impact. This information is used to create a picture of how an event could impact 
people. Supplementing this information is a form of crowdsourcing from social media 
(see 3.Crowdsourcing). During the Response and Recovery stages of the Disaster 
Management Cycle CDEM takes their predictions of impact and tries to assess the 
actual impact of an event. This stage uses data from ‘anywhere we can get it’, a common 
phrase noted in the interviews. This expresses the chaotic and fast paced nature of 
events which require CDEM to search for information wherever it may be available. 
Any information collected – whether from emergency services, active observations, 
other EOC participants, or even from social media (see 3.Crowdsourcing) – is then 
combined to help create a dynamic picture of the current ground situation. 
 
Information collected, regardless of its source, is valued for both its integrity and 
quality, as well as the temporal relevance of the data. Most forms of data used by 
CDEM, particularly during the Reduction and Readiness stages, have a high degree of 
trust while simultaneously lacking in temporal relevance within an event timescale. 
Some sources, such as the Emergency Services Contact’s (the internal information 
sharing network of emergency services) and direct response team observations serve to 
bridge this disparity, but as the adage is ‘anywhere we can get it,’ more sources with 
temporal relevance are desired for their positive impact on decision making.  
 
3. Crowdsourcing: 
CDEM respondents defined crowdsourcing as an effort to collect information from the 
public to help create a better understanding of a situation. This definition relates to 
CDEM’s main current source of crowdsourced data; directly volunteered reports 
(through local/regional Council call centres) and social media observations (conducted 
by intelligence teams in an EOC). These forms of crowdsourcing have proven very 
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effective at creating situational awareness, but are recognised in their current form to 
have limitations (see point 4).  
 
Emergency Management Southland is unique among CDEM participants as they have 
developed and are testing a crowdsourced application. This application is a direct 
crowdsourcing platform which will enable members of the public to send reports 
directly to the Council which can be reported (at the Council’s discretion) back to a 
publicly viewable web map. Early tests have been positive, however while the data 
collected has met their needs as a response agency, the costs of implementation were a 
considerable and limiting factor (see 4. Limitations). 
 
4. Limitations: 
All participants showed a good understanding of crowdsourcing while likely viewing 
this from mainly a data collection standpoint (as opposed to data processing). From this 
viewpoint, and in a general sense, crowdsourcing was met with concerns such as 
reliability/trustworthiness, along with apprehension with regard to the challenges of 
how to implement a crowdsourced system. To the first, CDEM participants expressed 
that with direct reporting by the public, particularly related to incident/damage reports, 
a lack of expertise can prevent information being taken at face value and resources 
being expended to follow up and confirm these reports. To the second, a considerable 
concern raised was that local and Regional CDEM organisations lack the necessary 
funding to implement a comprehensive data collection system and the associated 
awareness campaign. The general consensus is that, for a crowdsourcing system to be 
used at the extent CDEM would like, the system needs to be implemented at a national 
level. This is a sentiment also shared by Emergency Management Southland 
acknowledged the high cost of running a crowdsourced platform.  
 
5. Future Plans: 
Amongst CDEM leadership there has been a recognition of the need for data which can 
react to changes of the situation on the ground during an event. This has led to 
discussions around how crowdsourced data can be used to achieve this. The general 
view is that crowdsourcing will take a role within every future event in some capacity. 
Details of how crowdsourcing will be implemented are largely unknown and opinions 
vary between respondents as it was largely speculation. However, some more definitive 
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plans are known; active discussions at a national level are taking place regarding how 
crowdsourced data can be used; a test crowdsourced system is being implemented to 
help inform this discussion; and all participants agree that whatever system is 
implemented will likely be standardised and of a national scale.  
 
6. Relationships: 
A consensus was reached between the various interviewees regarding engagement with 
crowdsourcing groups; there hasn’t been any significant involvement to date. This was 
noted to not be a product of a disinterest, but instead a more incidental impact of CDEM 
still ‘maturing’ in their understanding of crowdsourcing as one participant opined. From 
a future perspective, this engagement is desired, but no notable action plan has been 
formed for how to find and engage crowdsourcing groups.   
 
 
4.2.2. New Zealand Defence Force via Geospatial Intelligence New Zealand 
1. Function: 
The New Zealand Defence Force acts on behalf of the government in support of CDEM. 
This includes a direct response from the different branches of the military under Joint 
Forces HQ which can provide logistical, intelligence, and physical support. Within the 
NZDF, Geospatial Intelligence New Zealand (GNZ) operates as the intelligence arm. 
As such, GNZ provides the most accurate representation of how geospatial data is used 
to engage with events, and therefore any potential use of crowdsourcing. The scope of 
their work ranges from domestic to international aid operations, and is primarily from 
a logistical perspective. At a technical level, GNZ uses standard GIS technology (ESRI 
products) also used by Civil Defence, as well as remote sensing image analysis 
software. However much of this is done within a secure data environment where outside 
collaboration can be challenging.  
 
2. Information Use: 
GNZ, working from a logistical focus, uses primarily a combination of government, 
private and internal data for creating appropriate maps for event response. This leaves 
little room for crowdsourced data in much of their preparation work which involves 
updating existing maps for response. While this is the case, there are two distinct 
43 
 
exceptions; international operations making use of OpenStreetMap; and an increasing 
view towards implementing crowdsourcing to supplement response maps in order to 
enhance logistical decision making.  
 
3. Crowdsourcing: 
GNZ defines crowdsourcing as an environment where people can provide spatial 
information, or in the words of one participant, “an environment where the general 
public can contribute to a geospatial picture.” This view is one of direct data 
contribution, again focusing on what people can tell response agencies, as with 
CDEM’s views. Direct contribution aligns well with GNZ’s focuses on logistical 
support overseas, especially in events being aided significantly by the presence of 
OpenStreetMap.  In these instances, participants informed me that OpenStreetMap has 
been an excellent source of information in countries where infrastructure data is not as 
up-to-date as in New Zealand.  
 
4. Limitations: 
When asked about flaws and limitations of crowdsourced data, GNZ participants noted 
two things. The first, a view shared by some participants from CDEM, is that 
crowdsourced data represents something new that is going to take time to implement 
into existing work. Notably, one GNZ member explained that the lack of a ‘single 
author control’ for crowdsourced data means that a level of learning is needed to 
understand how it can be used and if additional work, like verification, is needed to 
comfortably implement this data. Secondly, relating back to the role NZDF takes in 
events, more specific crowdsourced data, such as incident reports, are not a concern. 
The reasoning given for this is that a logistical focus requires a wider scope and is more 
concerned with datasets such as roads and bridges; crowdsourcing to-date in this area 
has proven to be very effective, and they cite OpenStreetMap in this.  
 
5. Future Plans: 
The future of crowdsourced data in New Zealand was one topic that GNZ participants 
spoke positively about in two contexts; applications for GNZ, and how crowdsourcing 
advances GIScience in general. Regarding its applications for GNZ, this is dependent 
on what is required of the organisation in the future. GNZ as an agency of the NZDF –  
and through that, Government – is directed as to where their efforts are to be used, but 
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using their current primary function of logistical intelligence support, crowdsourcing 
can be a powerful tool, even domestically. Participants from GNZ noted that a robust 
crowdsourcing platform that can collate information regarding changes to infrastructure 
during an event would be useful for this response agency. From a more generalized 
perspective, participants held the belief that crowdsourcing will be a critical component 
of GIScience in the future. To this end, some respondents emphasised the need for all 
disaster response agencies to become familiar with crowdsourcing theory, as it is 
predicted by GNZ participants that this type of data will become a major component of 
future data collection.  
 
6. Relationships: 
At the time of writing, there has been no engagement between GNZ and volunteer 
crowdsourcing organisations despite considerable involvement with formal response 
agencies. This is attributed to current activities and the limited use of crowdsourced 
data to-date. When asked if this position would possibly change, the response was 
positive. It was said by participants that, as crowdsourcing becomes more prevalent, 
there will be a need for direct engagement with groups outside of a normal CIMS 
environment, at least to the extent those groups are involved with the data that GNZ 
uses for its response work.  
4.2.3. New Zealand Red Cross 
1. Function: 
The New Zealand Red Cross, “has a number of guiding principles, but it is all based in 
the mission to improve the lives of vulnerable people, and mobilise the power of 
humanity. As part of that, we have arrangements with the [New Zealand] Government 
through our auxiliary status as a provider of support during a disaster; something which 
we have a remit to do internationally as Red Cross”. This status puts NZRC in a 
response provider position within CIMS. NZRC is primarily a response team provider 
through their Disaster Welfare Support Teams (DWST). From a GIS perspective, this 
means that there is limited engagement with processing spatial data, but NZRC acts as 
data collectors through their response teams. Importantly, it should be noted that DWST 





2. Information Use: 
Information used by NZRC comes from CDEM situation reports, along with an internal 
intelligence process from response team observations. It is through these DWST 
observations that some interesting insights have been gained. NZRC notes that their 
‘door knocking’ activities generate much of the crucial decision making information, 
as it is unfiltered and reflects any suffering that people in an event are experiencing. 
This information is also fed back into CIMS, which means the situation reports and 
observations are intrinsically connected.  
 
3. Crowdsourcing: 
The participant explained that crowdsourcing is not focused on by NZRC. Its fit within 




A strong reasoning for this lack of use is the focus on the most vulnerable; they 
explained that NZRC, by its mandate, are to take care of the most vulnerable. To do 
this, NZRC must focus on those who are in areas impacted (found through situation 
reports), and those who are most likely to be impacted, i.e. the most vulnerable. Because 
of this mandate, the participant raised a conundrum in that those most vulnerable are 
also those least likely to have access to the technology CGI is based. Essentially those 
who would most benefit from this technology are the least likely to have access to it. 
Further, regardless of socio-economic circumstance, in an event some areas will lose 
communication infrastructure thereby preventing CGI collection.   
 
5. Future Plans: 
NZRC does not have intentions to access crowdsourced data in the future, and instead 
has increased efforts to better collect and understand impacted people through response 
team technology. This is done through a system called MagPi. MagPi is a mobile survey 
platform that is used in door-to-door checks of properties that connect the information 
spatially with a central GIS system (usually operated in conjunction with an EOC). 
While this system isn’t explicitly crowdsourcing as it is still being collected/filtered by 





Of all the groups interviewed, with the exception of Ngāi Tahu, NZRC has the closest 
connection to community and volunteer groups with much of the people working under 
NZRC being volunteers themselves. It remains to be seen however for crowdsourcing 
groups to engage with NZRC, but the participant did recognise that groups looking to 
help those who are vulnerable will have a positive relationship with NZRC.  
 
4.2.4. Ngāi Tahu 
1. Function: 
Ngāi Tahu was a statutory partner in the recovery of the 2011 Christchurch Earthquake 
alongside the three local TAs impacted, with all four entities lead by CERA 
(Christchurch Earthquake Recovery Authority). This position made Ngāi Tahu, a New 
Zealand indigenous iwi, responsible for elements of response to this event. To this end, 
Ngāi Tahu assisted response and recovery through community support and direct 
intervention with grants/aid. From a technical perspective, Ngāi Tahu has an internal 
GIS team which allowed for monitoring of their iwi members during the event.  
 
2. Information Use: 
Ngāi Tahu uses publicly available information as part of its GIS, as well as internal 
information about iwi members. At present, it is estimated that around 10% of the Ngāi 
Tahu population is recorded on their GIS, and this was used extensively during the 
event to assist in rendering aid.  
 
3. Crowdsourcing: 
Similarly to NZRC, Ngāi Tahu has not focused specifically on crowdsourcing, but 
instead on methods of direct communication and providing aid to their community. This 
perspective, as well as that of working incredibly closely with a community devastated 
by an event, provides some useful insights into the benefit of close engagement with 
the public, a principle of crowdsourcing.  
 
4. Limitations: 
The organisational background, and the viewpoint generated, is shared by NZRC. The 
viewpoint is that crowdsourcing is a tool of the public, and for that tool to be controlled 
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by a central agency could be a mistake. Ngāi Tahu expressed that, for widespread 
collection of public information to be performed directly by the government, it could 
become biased and not serve to help those most in need. The view of Ngāi Tahu is that 
crowdsourced data needs to be unfiltered, and not bracketed into specific questions, in 
order to provide the most realistic view of what the needs of impacted peoples are. 
Crowdsourcing in Ngāi Tahu’s view should be driven by the public. 
 
5. Future Plans: 
There are no future plans for engagement with crowdsourcing in disaster response.  
 
6. Relationships: 
Ngāi Tahu, in the opinion of its representative, has excellent levels of engagement with 
the outside community. They view this level of success as a result of their own system; 
Joint Action Groups (JAG). JAGs were an organisation tool used to connect Ngāi Tahu 
to volunteer groups to facilitate response work. This model of leadership involved both 
planning and direct community engagement. JAGs functioned through community 
meetings and kaitoko (field surveyors) to create this model of response. The participant 
suggested that crowdsource planning could benefit from implementation of a 














4.3 Thematic Analysis 
Presented below are thematic analyses of the key research questions. These have been 
developed using the methods described in Chapter 2, and summarise key concepts and views 
held by the interview participants concerning CGI. These analyses will be used to inform 
discussion in Chapter 5 along with recommendations.  
4.3.1 Universal Themes 
• Advocating for the value of crowdsourcing 
o All participants agree that crowdsourcing can add valuable information to 
disaster response operations, the degree to which this is true varies however all 
(with the exception of Rik Tau) see crowdsourced data as a significant part of 
future disaster response operations 
• Social media primary method of crowdsourcing 
o CDEM, GNZ, and NZRC all use social media as a major form of 
crowdsourcing. For CDEM it is the primary way of finding out publicly 
generated information and for GNZ and NZRC it represents as way to gain 
situational awareness. 
• Need for information about people in need 
o Foundational information is generally available to the agencies, either through 
LINZ and government or through the Emergency Services Contract that is 
regularly updating to provide the most relevant information. This data however 
does not address the issue of who is in need after a natural event.  
• Crowdsourcing supplements existing information 
o As with the example of social media, these agencies view crowdsourced data as 
a supplementary source that can inform decisions and either provide indication 
of areas needing further investigation or potentially confirm reports or 
suspicions of people and places in need.  
• Crowdsourcing not a universal solution 
o Crowdsourcing is considered valuable however as noted by all participants is 
not the end solution to disaster response information. Much of the valuable 
information collected comes from analysis and reports from professionals in the 
field. Crowdsourcing can supplement this but not replace it. 
• Phases of a disaster need different information 
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o A theme amongst the participants was how different phases require different 
approaches, and therefore different datasets to understand the current situation. 
Notably it was discovered that CDEM operates over all 4 phases, while NZRC 
acts as a response agency and then community recovery support, and GNZ 
acting as an arm of the NZDF is primarily dealing with response efforts and 
contributing to some aspects of readiness, in the form of supplying data from 
defence assets.  
• Crowdsourcing best not used in isolation 
o The participants noted the inherent issues with using data that does not come 
from professional bodies with associated standards providing a form of quality 
control over their data. As such crowdsourcing as a single source of disaster 
response data is universally not accepted as best practice.  
4.3.2 Civil Defence and Emergency Management Themes 
• Actively developing crowdsourced application 
o Currently there are groups within CDEM who are creating crowdsourced 
applications and testing their capacity to work in a disaster. Most notable is the 
online reporting portal being set up by Emergency Management Southland.  
• Capability of setting up crowdsourced data campaigns 
o Participants from CDEM agencies reference previous disasters in which 
different forms of crowdsourcing has happened.  
4.3.3 New Zealand Red Cross Themes 
• Development of crowdsourced data not a high priority. 
o In interviewing Mat Darling from NZRC it became clear that the Red Cross’s 
role in disasters involves less management of information and more using their 
DWST resources to deal with issues passed on by CIMS. Additionally the view 
that crowdsourced data may exclude some venerable people and that door to 
door surveys with find those people, can explain why NZRC in general is not 
focusing as much on crowdsourcing.  
4.3.4 Geospatial Intelligence New Zealand Themes 
• Crowdsourcing represents a supplement to foundation datasets 
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o Through these interviews it became clear that existing sources of 
crowdsourcing, particularly OpenStreetMap, are highly valued for their 
potential to add to existing datasets. A special mention was mentioned by GNZ 
staff to how OpenStreetMap can provide up to date information particularly 
overseas in the South-Pacific. Notably this element of crowdsourcing was not 
viewed as being as important in New Zealand due to the pre-existing datasets 
from supplies like LINZ.   
4.3.5 Ngāi Tahu Themes 
• Individual perspective offers a highly valuable contribution to responding after a natural 
disaster. It was strongly noted that people should be able to give their own views and 
express what they feel is impacting them the most 
o Additionally a theme was that government organisations should not have full 
control over what information is given as there is a concern of bias.  
• Local involvement leads to better recovery outcomes with people becoming 
empowered to help themselves.  
• Existing social networks within Ngāi Tahu Iwi allowed for effective recovery strategy 
after the 2011 Christchurch earthquake. 
4.3.6 NZRC and CDEM common themes 
• Most venerable people risk being excluded in crowdsourcing 
o This view, held strongly by Red Cross, was also shared as a concern by Civil 
Defence participants. The recognised that crowdsourced data is limited by 
individuals access to cellular and internet coverage which can be severely 
limited during a disaster, particularly so during the response phase. 
 4.3.7 CDEM and GNZ common themes 
• Crowdsourcing policy should be at a national level 
o Both participants from CDEM and GNZ note that organisational policy has a 
significant role in the adoption of crowdsourced data. To this end CDEM talked 
about how a national approach to introducing crowdsourced data is needed to 
ensure consistency and make crowdsourced applications (and the teams to 
analyse the data) affordable. GNZ adds to this idea by noting that the scale of 
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organisations involved in disaster response means that even small changes 
become very complex, and to add widespread crowdsourcing will take time.  
• More collaboration needed – agencies and crowdsource volunteers 
o Both these agencies agree that if crowdsourcing is to progress into the future 
then it will either be internally directed and run or will involve outside volunteer 
groups. The former carries risks of bias in information gathered, while the later 
involves developing connections that do not currently exist. In regards to the 
later both agencies agree that steps to work not just amongst fellow agencies but 
also with community groups and crowdsourced initiatives is an important part 
of using this data in the future.  
• Geotagged photos a trusted form of crowdsourcing 
o Highlighted in all the interviews across CDEM and GNZ participants is the 
strong associated value with crowdsourced images, particularly those with 
geotags. The level of trust in images far exceeds written or verbal reports (while 
verbal reports are favoured because of the effort in contacting a response 
agency).  
• Crowdsourced data actively used 
o Both these agencies report using crowdsourced data in disaster response 
operations, either in the form of; longstanding datasets such as OpenStreetMap, 
crowdsourced campaigns by reputable groups such as TomNod, or more 












Chapter 5 – Discussion and Recommendations 
 
5.1. Discussion of findings 
5.1.1. How is crowdsourcing viewed by response agencies? 
As presented in the literature review, response agencies in international case studies could be 
generalised as having a low opinion of crowdsourcing. In general crowdsourcing is not trusted; 
perceived issues with accuracy and with who is producing the data contribute to this lack of 
trust. The case studies in which NGO or government organisations’ opinions are noted are 
usually in reference to Ushahidi application, and in at least one instance, (2008 Kenyan 
elections) Ushahidi organisers were in conflict with the then-in-power government’s interests. 
In other instances the issues were less consequential than in a conflict situation but in general 
there were trust issues around the quality of data. Johnson and Sieber (2013) noted how ‘trust’ 
in data is an important determining factor in organisations’ using a data source, and Lee (2016) 
supports this with a Korea-specific observation. This is a widely accepted perspective and is 
also made note of in Goodchild (2007), Haklay (2010) and Meier (2012).  
Counter to this ‘lack of trust’ is the positive opinion of New Zealand response agencies towards 
the idea of CGI. When asked, all participants agreed that there is application of crowdsourced 
information in disaster response. The most significant variation in the responses was on how 
crowdsourcing could be applied, as opposed to its level of usefulness, which I would 
characterise as being perceived as high. Of importance here is recognising that there is a 
difference between crowdsourced data and crowdsourcing collection. While all agree that 
crowdsourcing is an objective good, there is more diversity of opinion regarding who should 
be collecting this information.  
In regards to collecting information, a clear difference between the opinions of New Zealand 
NGOs (Red Cross and Ngāi Tahu) and the response arms of the government. While there was 
a variety of opinions expressed across the Civil Defence and NZDF interviews, they came back 
to a model of government implemented crowdsourcing where the public would send them 
information. The NGO interviews on the other hand suggested that, from an ethical perspective, 
the information provided should be driven by citizens and their perceived needs. Initially, this 
appeared as a fairly salient difference, however, after consideration, it forms one of the most 
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important decisions any future crowdsourcing system will need to address; who decides what 
information is important? 
The significance of a New Zealand perspective is that it would seem agencies have less 
apprehension around engaging with CGI in general. This I attribute to two important recurring 
comments: the first being that agencies typically view every source of data critically and do 
not take anything as automatically correct, allowing for CGI to fit into data assessment 
workflow easily; the second is that the value of highly up-to-date information can outweigh the 
perceived issues when implemented with caution and in conjunction with other information.  
5.1.2. What specific information should be collected? 
In responding to crises one of the most important factors for success is access to good 
information (Cutter, 2006; Goodchild and Glennon, 2010; McDougall, 2012). Information 
needed in this area includes base infrastructure data, topography and weather data, and hazard 
information. These data are generally at hand during a response operation (Cutter, 2006), 
however what is not as readily available is information on current conditions of infrastructure 
and people impacted (Goodchild and Glennon, 2010). This point in raised in many papers 
examining CGI which praise the temporal quality of CGI as a solution to this issue (e.g. Bruns, 
2014; Elwood et al, 2017; Haklay 2010; Starbird, 2011). 
A focus of the interviews was on what information was wanted by response agencies. To this, 
an interesting answer which several participants gave was, “anything [they] can get”. With the 
considerable time pressure and the scale of impact some natural events have on areas, a real 
pressure experienced is a lack of current information. Particularly, NZDF and Civil Defence 
participants noted that in New Zealand they are fortunate to have large amounts of base data 
and technical expertise to predict possible impacts of different disasters. What is lacking, 
however, is specifics of where people have been impacted. For instance, while models have 
been developed to predict flooding, the actual impact during an event is often different to a 
degree. To this end, response agencies are interested in any information that may help 
understand the situation better.  
While more information is often better, as described by response agencies, there was consensus 
on more useful pieces of information for response operations and the type of information given. 
Specifically, Civil Defence wants information critical to people’s direct physical safety; food, 
water, and shelter access, property issues such as sewage leaks or significant damage, and 
infrastructure damage. While the NZDF, as a logistical arm of response efforts, wants to know 
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information such as road issues, suitable sites for helicopter or aeroplane access, and what 
resources are available (to determine the type of aid that they will supply). Furthermore, a 
strongly held view across these interviews was that crowdsourced data, when supplied with 
photographic evidence, was the best form of data available. This was attributed to the increased 
level of trust in photography, the ability to make internal assessments of the ground situation, 
and the ability to direct a member of the public (in a direct crowdsourced feed such a video 
call) to look at key details that experts can use to make remote judgements. This information 
relates directly to the purpose of these agencies, and certainly can be addressed by 
crowdsourced data, however it is not everything that is produced when engaging with the 
public. Crowdsourced data can go beyond just reports of damage, and access to food, water, 
and shelter, but can give both a sense of need as well as expressing hardship in less measurable 
terms.  
One key identified by both of the NGO participants, was how when people in need are asked 
broad questions regarding their welfare, the information gathered is richer, and gives a much 
more holistic understanding of need. For many, during disasters, need is not measured in litres 
of water or cans of food but in concern for the future of their farm or anxiety about friends and 
family that have not been contacted. These represent another aspect of harm caused by 
disasters; emotional stress. In this regard, and while response agencies may not be able to 
directly alleviate all of this, crowdsourcing represents an avenue for a form of data on an impact 
previously untraceable; harm. There is an opportunity for disaster response agencies here in 
this form of information, as the ability to track and analyse patterns of harm as part of longer 
term plans to deal with the aftermath of a disaster. Additionally this is a direct form of aid, 
which community organisations like Ngāi Tahu or humanitarian missions like the Red Cross, 
can address.  
Participants in this research have provided helpful insight into what information is needed for 
response. Based on what is currently being used, and what is desired on the part of agencies, it 
is clear that CGI has the capability to fill in some of the gaps left by traditional reconnaissance 
and situational awareness efforts. This is in agreement with the literature which generally 






5.1.3. Effective use of social media or indirect/non-volunteered crowdsourcing 
Social media-sourced CGI is a very popular source of information, it is easily accessible, 
already publicly available, and captures an audience that may otherwise not engage with 
crowdsourcing (Ahmed and Sargent, 2014; Bruns, 2014; Coleman et al., 2009; Rouse et al., 
2009). Coleman et al. (2009) explained that people experience different motivations when 
contributing to CGI, and social media is likely one of the largest categories in data quantity as 
it is a passive form of contribution. This is supported by Heipke (2010) with the identified CGI 
contributor category of ‘Passive mappers’. Passive mappers contribute through outputs not 
intended for use in crowdsourcing. This actually gives one potential advantage over direct 
crowdsourcing as the content is made without a creator’s bias. Additionally with location-based 
technology the output in becoming increasing spatially accurate.  
What is clear from the interviews with all agencies is that social media forms a large component 
of their information gathering processes. Additionally, social media is used as a primary 
method of communication to the public, particularly among the younger demographics. This 
means that social media as a form of crowdsourcing could be considered to be a disaster 
response agencies largest step in the direction of crowdsourced data. This step, however, is 
notably rooted in direct data manipulation through direct staff monitoring of social media, and 
extrapolating information and patterns through this. However, this is in conflict with the most 
recent literature on the subject of social media crowdsourcing. The literature on the subject 
focuses on the use of software tools to directly take social media feeds and translate them into 
usable intelligence. This research holds particular importance, as social media has been being 
used more in disasters; evident from both the numbers of discrete posts relating to disaster 
events, and social media sites implementing disaster specific functions such as Facebook’s 
‘Check in’ system. If the trend continues, then it can be reasoned that social media posts during 
disasters will become more and more difficult to manage manually. The issue is compounded 
by an assumption that the more disaster response agencies engage online with the public, the 
more return information will be received through social media.  
Indirect crowdsourcing in New Zealand has been popular for disaster response, with large 
amounts of posts being made during a natural event. Local agencies have been able to employ 
teams to comb through these data to help develop situational awareness. What is less clear 
however is if New Zealanders will be more or less likely to engage with direct crowdsourcing 
on the same level they do with social media. Literature suggests it will be probably less as it 
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requires less effort to contribute to social media (as well as it being part of everyday life for 
many anyway) but this cannot be known for certain.  
5.1.4. New Zealand Civil Defence test crowdsourcing system and how it has influenced 
recommendations 
The last part of this thesis addresses a set of recommendations directed towards government 
response agencies, all of which centre around a proposed crowdsourcing system. This proposed 
crowdsourcing system draws inspiration from Ushahidi (Okolloh, 2009), as well as lessons 
learned about grassroots crowdsourcing efforts, but uses Emergency Management Southland’s 
(in-development at time of writing) crowdsourcing application as a structure. Specific lessons 
learnt include: CGI platforms benefit from using multiple input sources (Heinzelman and 
Walters, 2010), helping to maximise data collection; the increase in bulk data can create issues 
(Munro, 2010), however crowdsourcing labour can be a potential solution (Neis and Zipf, 
2012); citizens can be very effectively mobilised to respond to specific events evident through 
the Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team program (Neis and Zipf, 2012; Palen et al., 2015) and 
the GEO-CAN engagement (Ghosh, 2011).  
Emergency Management Southland’s crowdsourced system is a web portal showing an 
interactive map of the Southland region. To contribute, users take the following steps:  
1. Access the web page through the Emergency Management Southland website 
2. The user creates a report based on a location (searchable) 
a. Report contains a location coordinate, a type of incident (from a dropdown 
menu), and a description of the issue.  
3. The report is uploaded with contributors contact information to Civil Defence. 
4. Civil Defence then uses data for response 
5. Reports can be posted publicly if Civil Defence wishes, with only a user’s own posts 
being viewable before this.  
While this is only in development, it does provide a solid, and tested (in simulated scenarios), 
foundation to model a system on. Key points about this system include identifying the 
contributor; giving contributors a simple user interface; and providing categories of incidents. 
By identifying the contributor, it is believed that this ensures accuracy by making contributors 
accountable for any potentially misleading reports. The simple user interface allows people to 
find or search for locations of an incident, which encourages people who are not as 
technologically literate to use the system. Finally, by providing a dropdown menu, it both gives 
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ease of use to the contributors, and can focus responses into discrete categories for improved 
usability by responding agencies.  
The platform by Emergency Management Southland makes some very positive steps towards 
effective crowdsourcing based on an academic understanding. The strength of this platform is 
that it focuses on specific events and a call for responses by the local authorities. This 
encourages participation as well as providing a good mechanism for input through a web portal. 
Improvements include expanding mechanisms for input from SMS, email, and direct calls, 
however there is not enough research at present to assess how effective these alternative 
mechanisms would be in a New Zealand environment. Additionally, literature highlights the 
power of crowdsourced labour for processing information which the system in its present 
design does not take advantage of.   
 
5.1.5. Who does crowdsourcing serve, response agencies or the public?  
Crowdsourcing is often viewed from the perspective of the end-consumers of the data; these 
naturally are often response agencies (Goodchild, 2007). For this reason CGI research can 
easily become over-focused on what crowdsourcing can do for agencies and not what it can do 
for the contributors. Some authors have addressed this (Chilton, 2009; Elwood, 2008; 
Goodchild, 2007; Lee, 2016) and note that CGI research needs to examine the social benefit of 
crowdsourcing. Research in this field concludes that CGI offers not only benefit to users but 
also to the people who engage with it. This happens in two respects: the first is CGI allows a 
mechanism of communication between people and has been particularly prevalent in crisis 
Ushahidi applications (Martin-Shields and Stones, 2014; Okolloh, 2009; Yates and Paquette, 
2011); Secondly it also helps people create a sense of ownership over their information and 
contributions, particularly noticeable in OpenStreetMap which created a community of 
contributors (Chilton, 2009; Haklay, 2010). These benefits should not be overlooked and 
provide a justification for including citizens in the development of a crowdsourced platform.  
The interviews conducted by this study can be broken into two primary groups; government, 
and non-government agencies. This division is most strongly exemplified in approaches to 
whom crowdsourcing should serve. It is clear from these interviews that CDEM and GNZ view 
crowdsourcing as a method to assist in better, more informed, decision making. For these 
agencies, crowdsourced data is about the collection of information. Contrasting this, NZRC 
and Ngāi Tahu, while not as involved in crowdsourced data discussions, view crowdsourcing 
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as a tool of the public to express what is important to them. This dichotomy touches on an 
important aspect of CGI research; should crowdsourcing be directed to create more efficient 
and relevant data, or should crowdsourcing be used as a way to see what is most important to 
contributors by viewing what is presented as a whole?  Ngāi Tahu urged for a community 
driven approach to CGI, and warned of imposing an external criteria on data collected. Their 
concern was that a government driven crowdsourcing campaign may not collect information 
that reflects the true depth of an individual’s impact from an event, including both physical and 
spiritual/community needs.  
After considering the responses from each participant, the agency-directed crowdsourcing by 
Emergency Management Southland, and how crowdsourcing has been utilised overseas with 
the community-driven Ushahidi and OpenStreetMap platforms, the conclusion drawn is that a 
structured platform is needed to meet response agency needs, but without community 
engagement the system will be flawed. It is clear that unstructured data would prevent a lot of 
the benefits crowdsourcing offers, particularly in terms of timeliness, which is a key factor in 
response effectiveness. However, an individual’s situation is much more complicated than a 
dropdown menu on an interface could address, particularly if that person is to be able to give 
response agencies a holistic understanding of their situation. It is the opinion of this thesis that 
any crowdsourced platform that is created needs to first address the question of: aside from 
facilitating aid, what benefits does a system of communication and reporting offer a member 
of the public, and how can that be used for mutual benefit?  
 
5.2. Recommendations 
5.2.1. National level lead crowdsourcing effort 
What became clear in interviews, particularly with members of Civil Defence and the NZDF, 
was that decisions relating to crowdsourcing would ultimately be made at a national level. 
While local Civil Defence agencies have the autonomy to pursue information from wherever 
they can source it, it was noted by almost all participants that a proper (direct) crowdsourcing 
campaign would be prohibitively expensive. This led to comments such as one from a Civil 
Defence manager that ‘any real crowdsourcing across Civil Defence would need to be 
nationally lead and funded’. This, however, has not stopped some regional authorities from 
pursuing crowdsourcing, as is the case of Emergency Management Southland, although it must 
be remembered that this example is also a test case, and with a limited budget.  
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Comments referring to budgetary limitations, and an expressed high cost of producing software 
and web portals, leads me to conclude that if New Zealand is to have a robust source of (direct) 
crowdsourced data, then funding, if not leadership and direction, needs to come directly from 
the New Zealand Government. An important element found in the interviews was how, 
depending on the scale of the event, a different governing body would manage the response. 
For example, a local fire may fall the local city council and their Civil Defence team, but if that 
same fire was to cross over two districts then it may expand out to a regional Civil Defence 
response. From this, I believe that crowdsourced data collection needs to be standardised in 
some form, such as through the implementation of a crowdsourced platform that is on a national 
scale. This would allow for all response efforts from local to regional or national, and would 
all have the same type and format of information being collected. This would empower smaller 
response efforts to still use crowdsourced data despite its high start-up cost.  
5.2.2. Community engagement and support for volunteer crowdsourcing initiatives 
An area which is notably missing from the current New Zealand crowdsourcing space is a 
direct connection between the wider crowdsourcing community and response agencies. I 
believe that part of this is that crowdsourcing groups like what was seen in the Canterbury 2011 
earthquake were formed in a reactive manner to a need. From overseas studies (Ahmed & 
Sargent, 2014; Bruns & Burgess, 2014; Martin-Shields & Stones, 2014; Munro, 2010; Soden 
& Palen, 2014), it is clear that having an established base of crowdsources can yield some 
incredible data that rivals government and private survey (see OpenStreetMap). These groups, 
however, were developed by initiatives, usually starting with simply an open platform being 
presented to people. The trend is that once a platform for crowdsourcing is created, the 
crowdsources will very likely follow on and create a self-sustaining community. This paper’s 
recommendations largely focus around a MCDEM driven crowdsourced platform, however a 
strong recommendation is that work should be done to see how crowdsourcing can be used 
outside of disasters, as developing a network of dedicated volunteers will have a high likelihood 
of benefiting any crowdsourced effort during a disaster.  
5.2.3. Efforts to increase literacy about the use of crowdsourced data 
At present, most people, at least those with an internet connection, are already crowdsourcing 
contributors. However, most of these active contributors to the wider body of public data have 
likely never engaged with the idea of crowdsourcing, despite participating in it every time they 
create a Facebook post. This problem comes back to the idea of citizen GIScience, and 
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empowering people to contribute, with meaning, to a collective understanding of their world 
(Goodchild, 2007). People, at least from the numbers of people engaging in social media during 
a disaster, have an innate desire to share and to help. To this end, efforts are needed to eliminate 
the disconnect between people’s ability to contribute, and their perceived value in their 
contributions, by creating a public understanding that an individual’s experiences are important 
to people trying to respond to a disaster, whether that be from a person experiencing hardship 
or a person who has observed hardship. People need to be empowered to speak up and share 
information that normally is kept to themselves. In order to mitigate issues around lack of 
access to CGI caused by personal circumstance, this thesis recommends a CGI education 
campaign to go alongside a CGI application being deployed. While literature on CGI education 
is sparse, a logical step in this direction would be an associated awareness campaign around 
how any implemented crowdsourced platform worked, and how to use it effectively. For 
example, what information was desired and when should someone post or call emergency 
services instead. Further this is a valuable area of Geospatial Science and given its increasing 
prevalence in this field, should be a focus of geospatial education.  
5.2.4. Further investigation into lessons from community support networks, such as Ngāi 
Tahu, and their impact on the speed of information. 
From the interviews with Ngāi Tahu, it became clear that their information about iwi members 
was detailed and represented a positive outcome of communities communicating with each 
other during a disaster. Through community lists and interpersonal networks, the Joint Action 
Groups (JAGs) worked quickly to assess impacts on community members. A parallel can be 
drawn here with the initial community-driven roots of crowdsourcing, with Ushahidi and OSM 
as examples. In that regard it is the opinion of this thesis that JAGs, and their subsequent use 
in disaster response, provide further evidence that a community-driven CGI effort (perhaps 
supported by official agencies) also has merit in a New Zealand context. Further research is 
needed focusing on public opinion towards crowdsourcing to give a more definitive conclusion 
as to whether or not a citizen driven CGI would be effective.  
5.2.5. A national level, regionally implemented, public disaster crowdsourcing platform.  
As a product of this research I have designed a crowdsourced platform for implementation in 
New Zealand. Below is the structural outline for CGI platform potentially implemented by 
CDEM or another national-level agency. From here on it will be referred to as the Citizen 
Response Network (CRN). CRN is broken down into three sections, each described under the 
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headings; Purpose and Reach; Structure and Function; Funding and Authority; Issues Needing 
Addressing.  
Purpose and Reach: CRN serves as a platform for all non-life-threatening emergencies during 
a natural event. It would function as an online platform that can receive communication from 
SMS, a call service, emails, and most importantly, an online hazard reporting website. The 
purpose of this would be to centralise information from the public during an event so as to 
provide a more efficient form of intelligence gathering. Additionally, the proposed system 
below explicitly seeks to mobilise the willingness and desire of people to help during times of 
emergency in such a way that some of the concerns raised through this thesis can be mitigated. 
This system is not designed to supersede CDEM EOCs, but to instead work within an EOC 
environment, or be run remotely in a large enough event (when outside volunteer staff would 
be used).  
CRN has been thought of in the context of a national level application and would have a reach 
as such. However, and this is addressed in the final sub-heading (issues), there are still 
significant populations in New Zealand that during an emergency could be excluded from a 
system such as this. This means that it can be considered to have a wide reach, but with some 
significant blind spots that follow any system based in communications technology.  
62 
 
Structure and Function:  
 




The CRN is based on the Emergency Management Southland model altered to reflect the 
studies findings. Its sections are divided into; public impact and response (red); information 
processing (blue); and outputs of CRN (green). When an event occurs, the CRN gives an outlet 
for people to report issues caused by the event. This information is fed into the CRN through 
SMS, email, a direct phone service, and – most importantly – the online website. Information 
from SMS, email and phone will be manually entered into the web portal by CDEM staff. This 
information joins the publicly contributed data from the website (with staff entered data having 
already been assessed against the criteria of urgency and suggested reliability). From here, it is 
accessed by the CDEM intelligence team who will view reports through a GIS application for 
Direct Response Efforts (DRE) and pattern analysis. Analysis of the data is something that 
would require training and more highly skilled workers, and as such, CRN offers a form of 
citizen mobilisation to counteract the pressure on CDEM staff during periods of high 
information intake. CRN proposes to engage with volunteers before a natural hazard event 
occurs, and have a pre-existing body of workers who can take the SMS, email and phone inputs 
and convert them to GIS entries for CDEM to make decisions from. From here, the output of 
CRN is a direct feed of single-source crowdsourced data, and social flow-on effects of citizen 
empowerment (through volunteers), and improved education about disasters (from 
implementing an interactive CDEM system).  
Funding and authority: as established above, local and regional Civil Defence organisations do 
not have the financial capability to pursue a project such as this at the scale proposed. This 
lends itself to the conclusion that the only other reasonable source of funding falls to the central 
New Zealand Government, specifically MCDEM. While this may initially seem to be an issue 
for the government with a very high cost for what is another source of data, I believe it is 
important to also understand the benefit of a centralised authority. One of the elements brought 
to my attention during these interviews was that different agencies deal with disaster 
information differently. This can cause inefficiencies in collection, and a central authority 
would allow for greater control over data acquisition. This element, while a boon to CDEM 
operations does raise what is probably the greatest flaw in the CRN, a government focused 
collection.  
Issues needing addressing: The model proposed here has been formed with an efficient model 
of centralisation and government authority of the system. This, however, is in contradiction 
with the philosophical point of crowdsourcing; to be a free flow of information from the public. 
To this end, I believe it would be very unwise to implement any form of national 
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crowdsourcing, without seriously addressing the two following questions; who directs what 
sort of information should be collected; and, should information be isolated to response 
agencies or republished to the public to empower citizen response. The following two 
paragraphs briefly address these questions to explain how they apply to the CRN model but do 
not offer an answer; only a strong recommendation of how to approach solving these.  
 
This CRN model does not specify the questions or specific information requests, although it 
can be inferred by the reader that there is a more focused collection effort to facilitate efficient 
data analysis. To this end, what questions are asked of the public becomes critically important, 
not only for how useful the information collected is, but also for how well the system addresses 
community needs. Raised both by the Red Cross and Ngāi Tahu was the concern around bias 
of information collected by government agencies such as Civil Defence. In these interviews, 
they advocated for a grassroots collection methodology in which affected communities 
determine what information they want to share as it relates to their perceived needs. The 
difference between these potential viewpoints is something that should be investigated further 
through workshops to examine what peoples perceived needs are post-disaster.  
CRN in its proposed form is, for the most part, a one-way flow of information. Members of the 
public volunteer information to CRN, and while some of the (citizen) volunteer’s access this 
information, the results are published internally within the EOC structure. This system is a 
logical place to start, as it ensures that information is provided to response agencies for decision 
making. CRN in this form of output however, excludes the general public from making use of 
the information collected. The question of which approach, closed or open access, is best 
remains controversial. Raised in the interviews with CDEM and GNZ, it was clear that the 
view was that responders need to be cautious with information received, as it can be inaccurate 
or incomplete. This cautious approach allows for further investigation and care consideration 
before a direct response is attempted. Conversely the general public isn’t as restricted and could 
directly respond to reports, potentially helping or harming the situation depending on many 
variables. From the literature however, we know that when crowdsourcing is done in a 
grassroots manner (international Ushahidi case studies being the prime example) there have 
been very positive results. As there are conflicting viewpoints, further workshopping needs to 
be done to come to a decision of how much the public should be able to access with regard to 
consolidated information. This paper holds the opinion that to maintain the integrity of a 
crowdsourced system, citizen direct response needs to also be facilitated. It is suggested then 
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that a secondary (public) output is created which shows validated information of reports that 
people can help with directly, for instance people needing transport to welfare centres. This 
idea does carry significant legal challenges and will need to be considered carefully before any 




Chapter 6 - Summary & Conclusions 
6.1. Summary 
Crowdsourced information has become an increasingly relevant part of geospatial data 
collection. This is true across various fields within GIS, but particularly so in disaster response 
work. CGI or VGI presents a few distinct advantages to the more traditional sources which 
have the potential to advance decision making in an event. These advantages include; a high 
degree to temporal relevance, or information being near to ‘real-time’; information coming 
from direct observations of an event site; the data collection process acting as a method of 
communication for people in a difficult and venerable situation; and crowdsourcing as a 
concept having the potential to give insight to response agencies about the issues which are 
most prevalent to victims of disasters.  
Research in this field has been largely focused overseas, and often concerns places with less 
developed infrastructure and response networks than New Zealand. Further, the research that 
has involved New Zealand, while providing excellent insight into case studies of events and 
the crowdsourced products of those events, has had a relatively narrow focus. To this end, this 
thesis was designed to answer a fairly broad question with a specific audience; how can 
crowdsourced data be used by New Zealand responders to improve response to a natural event 
impacting people and/or infrastructure? To understand this, lessons from literature were 
needed. 
In examining the literature on the subject (Ahmed and Sargent, 2014; Bruns and Burgess, 2014; 
Martin-Shields and Stones, 2014; McDougall, 2012; Palen et al, 2015; Yates and Paquette, 
2011; Zook et al, 2010), it was found that crowdsourced data had been used very effectively 
overseas to help deal with events. This often came back to specific applications of 
crowdsourcing, including; OpenStreetMap, a road/infrastructure map similar in function to a 
publicly generated version of GoogleMaps; and Ushahidi, a crowdsourcing platform driven by 
those directly impacted by an event. Case studies surrounding these applications yielded 
several lessons including: 
• People are naturally driven to communicate, and this can be used to gain a level of 
situational awareness not possible elsewhere 
• Crowdsourcing serves as both a tool for response agencies, but also a support network 
for private citizens 
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• Crowdsourcing is not a perfect source of information, but as they become used more 
often, crowdsourced systems have found ways to improve information, such as 
OpenStreetMap’s system of prioritising known contributors.  
• Social media has a huge role in crowdsourcing and this information is becoming 
increasingly socialised, with much of it being geotagged.  
 
These lessons were taken, and used to establish core questions to be used in a series of 
interviews with key informants. Interviews were used as the primary source of information to 
inform this study, as, by talking with experts working in New Zealand response, it would be 
possible to gauge the following: 
• How the New Zealand specific conditions impact on our response/data used, compared 
to the overseas use of such data.  
• Develop a baseline for how crowdsourced data is viewed, as well as get expert opinions 
on how it could be used in New Zealand 
• Discover any existing uses of crowdsourced data, and use this to develop a series of 
recommendations of how best to use CGI in New Zealand. 
Thematic analysis of 9 interviews revealed patterns and areas of both agreement, and 
contention, between participants. This analysis generated the findings of this study, and the 
conclusions of how crowdsourced data can be used to aid disaster response.  
 
6.2. Conclusions 
Several themes were established relating to how New Zealand response agencies use 
information for decision making, and how crowdsourced data fits into their processes and wider 
discussions. In terms of general themes, it was discovered that: 
• Crowdsourcing as an idea was advocated by all participants. Its value in providing 
timely and ‘ground-level’ information was considered as being of importance by 
response agencies.  
• At present, crowdsourcing, with exception of Emergency Management Southland’s 
test, is confined to social media, and limited direct information provided to 
local/regional councils.  
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• Agencies recognise that work done in preparation (Reduction to Readiness) to identify 
where response is needed is only an estimation. Once an event happens, the actual 
places where people are in need is largely unknown until response teams provide that 
information. Crowdsourcing is acknowledged as a way to speed up this process.  
• Crowdsourcing is not a complete solution to the information problem, and is best used 
in conjunction with other sources.  
Agency specific themes include: 
• Civil Defence Emergency Management is in the process of developing a crowdsourced 
platform (at a single regional level at the time of writing). This comes from lessons 
learnt in other events where crisis maps, which are a form of crowdsourcing, has been 
used to a positive impact. 
• The New Zealand Defence Force via Geospatial Intelligence New Zealand views 
crowdsourced data as an enhancer of existing foundational datasets (an opinion shared 
with CDEM), and sees potential in crowdsourcing supplementing these datasets, 
particularly as they can change rapidly in response to an event which is impacting 
infrastructure.  
• The New Zealand Red Cross shared concerns that some people may be at risk of being 
excluded from crowdsourcing, either through event impacted communication issues, or 
being in an area that has a low level of ownership of technology/education around 
crowdsourcing.  
• Ngāi Tahu urged for a community driven approach to crowdsourcing, and warned of 
imposing an external criteria on data collected. Their concern was that a government 
driven crowdsourcing campaign may not collect information that reflects the true depth 
of an individual’s impact from an event, including both physical and 
spiritual/community needs.  
The importance of developing a crowdsourcing platform in New Zealand evolved from the 
interviews. Aside from their agreement that this is a positive step, both agencies gave similar 
input regarding how it should be implemented:  
• Any crowdsourcing platform in New Zealand that responds to an event needs to be 
delivered at a national level. This was supported by evidence in the case of Emergency 
Management Southland’s crowdsourcing test. This test found that the cost of 
implementing a CGI platform is high. Furthermore to ensure quality/issues are met 
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effectively it needs to be standardised or risk having some systems being less effective 
than others.  
• An area where these agencies need to progress, is engagement with external 
crowdsourcing groups. At this stage, there is a lack of communication with 
crowdsourcing groups, partially because these groups often self-establish in direct 
response to an event.  
The themes presented here were considered, and related to insights gained from literature. From 
this, several recommendations were given; crowdsourcing should be at a national level and use 
the model presented (CRN) as a base; a form of community engagement and fostering of 
crowdsourced initiatives is needed; and, as part of community engagement, an awareness 
campaign of how people can contribute is needed for any crowdsourcing platform: 
• Crowdsourcing is most logically implemented at a national level, and this paper 
proposes the Citizen Response Network to meet this. The CRN uses the framework of 
Emergency Management Southland’s test but is not a complete model. It is essential 
that further development is done to address whether the public should be able to access 
this information, and how can the system be implemented to gain a holistic 
understanding of people’s needs, as well as not excluding people with limited access 
to technology. 
• Community engagement is highly recommended to address these major issues with the 
CRN model. By working with the community, as well as any groups – particularly 
those involved with the 2011 Christchurch Earthquake – who deal with crowdsourcing, 
CRN can be developed further to mitigate some of these issues. The hope is that talking 
with community groups can inform response agencies as to what those impacted would 
want to communicate and why.  
• At present, CRN makes no attempt to address how to capture responses from all people 
impacted by an event. However, it is the recommendation of this thesis that this needs 
to be worked through before it is used in an event. A failure to do so could potentially 
result in people being missed and ignored amongst the information produced.  
 
Crowdsourcing offers an excellent source of information with the potential to dramatically 
improve decision making in a disaster. This information needs to be harnessed as people 
already want to contribute to it. Disaster response work in New Zealand would continue to 
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benefit from implementing crowdsourced data more than they have already. It is advised, 
however, that as with any new source of information, its integration needs to be approached 
with caution in both how it can be used, as well as how it will impact the wider public in their 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire used during interviews 
1. In the work you conduct on behalf of your organisation, has any of this been related to 
disaster response operations? If so, how would you characterise the work you do? 
2. In broad terms, please describe the functions your organisation has in relation to 
planning/intelligence, both geospatial and otherwise? 
3. Across planning/intelligence activities, what kinds of geographic information systems 
are used, and what products are made for the response effort? 
4. What sources of data are used in these products, excluding crowdsourced data? 
a. Are these sources internal or external in nature? 
b. How would you characterise the data in terms of trustworthiness, accessibility, 
and level of relevance? 
5. In the current state of disaster response, where are the major gaps in available 
information? What information would you want to access in an ideal situation? 
6. Please take a moment to describe to me what your understanding of crowdsourced data 
is, and how it has been relevant to disaster response operations. 
7. Has crowdsourced data been part of any operations you have conducted? And/or are 
there future plans to incorporate crowdsourced data into planning/intelligence 
operations? 
The following questions relate to how crowdsourced data has been used internationally, and 
the findings of literature on the subject. Some will be preceded by a prefacing statement to 
provide insight or evidence related to the questions immediately following. Please answer the 
questions from your perspective as a professional in this field, and where possible from the 
perspective of your respective organisation. 
8. Is your organisation aware of Ushahidi as a platform given its prevalence in disasters? 
9. Will the source of the crowdsourced data influence response agencies’ decisions (e.g. 
being done with support of volunteering professionals like Ushahidi’s crisis group 
(volunteers often lead by professionals) or directly from the public (such as from 
Twitter and Facebook)? 
77 
 
Statement: In researching this topic, it was found that in several instances crowdsourced data 
collection was driven by individuals or community needs, and not by information requirements 
of response agencies that often used the data after collection had taken place. 
10. If you could determine specific information collection efforts from the public, what 
would the focus be? 
11. How would you characterise your organisation’s relationship with the public through 
social media? Are there any systems in place to make use of social media and 
crowdsourcing platforms to communicate or collect information? 
Statement: During the 2010 Chilean earthquake, a well-documented case of crowdsourcing 
being misused was a life-threatening situation being posted on the crisis map and over Twitter, 
prompting a response of 3 fire trucks and 30 police. This turned out to be a hoax report. 
12. Do you have much concern over this kind of behaviour? With your current systems, 
what systems/processes are in place to deal with direct reports of people in trouble, if 
any? 
Statement: Much research on crowdsourced data concerns the evolving forms of public use of 
social media technology to broadcast information and updates. The research also addresses 
methods or technologies that allow for filtering and verification of critical data. 
13. As an organisation, do you have a focus on identifying new forms of data collection or 
data sources, or is the focus towards using existing forms of data more effectively, 
whether crowdsourced or otherwise? 
14. How would the presence of a robust system for sorting through large amounts of social 
media posts, and displaying only relevant reports, impact on your current view of social 
media’s application in planning and operations? 
Statement: Some researchers have noted a lack of cooperation between volunteer map-making 
groups and professional organisations. This is often related to the idea that information from 
the public cannot be trusted, and that volunteers, while well-meaning, are not professionals 
with formal training in data quality and information production. 




16. Have there been issues regarding access to information, or the publishing of information 
through systems such as the EQNZ (Earthquake New Zealand) crisis map for the 2011 
Christchurch earthquakes? 
17. Does the nature of the information collected, from whom and regarding what, change 
any of your above views? For example, would reports on non-life threatening issues, 
such as power outages or street flooding, be viewed differently to reports of trapped 
people or people in direct danger? 
From our conversation here is there anything you would like to add to help inform my 
knowledge about crowdsourcing from the perspective of your organisation? 
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Appendix B: Detailed interview synopses 
Please note – due to University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee requirements, 
interviewee name, gender and role have been anonymised and replaced with “XXXX”. 
 
Interview 1: XXXX, Geospatial Intelligence New Zealand (GNZ), 21st July 2017 
Method of interview: Zoom teleconference  
• XXXX of Geospatial Intelligence New Zealand, an agency of the New Zealand Defence 
Force (NZDF). XXXX is the XXXX of this agency and through this work has extensive 
experience with GIS systems, partially as how they relate to decision making and policy 
matters.  
• GNZ, as the spatial intelligence arm of the Defence Force, is tasked with providing 
maps and spatial information for the New Zealand Government during disaster 
operations. This information is used both from a ground level task management level 
in the form of map and intelligence products, and up to a policy level with disaster 
management decision makers in Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) and 
the executive branch (New Zealand Government) strategy. XXXX characterises the 
work GNZ does as trying to provide an understanding of the situation to government 
decision makers, as well as providing as much information as possible for response 
agencies to be able to plan response tasks effectively. From a technical perspective, 
GNZ has the access to, and the capability to use most current GIS systems including 
online platforms for unclassified environments. These data are worked with Open 
Geospatial Consortium (OGC) formats to ensure other agencies can work with the data.  
• XXXX characterises the sources of data used by GNZ as being ‘well sourced from a 
foundation geospatial point of view’. Making reference to the use of Land Information 
New Zealand (LINZ) data sets, and the Defence Force’s involvement in the Emergency 
Services Contract (a consortium of datasets and providers that is funded by the 
government). Additionally, being an NZDF agency, XXXX also notes that New 
Zealand defence assets can also collect data such as imagery and LiDAR, alongside 
private or public production of the same. Further, XXXX says that they will ‘also take 




• When asked about the applicability of these data, XXXX noted that ‘as professionals 
[they] can look at the data [they] have access to […] and see how that information was 
derived and created […] to weigh the decisions made against it’. To this, XXXX 
discussed how data taken from LINZ or the Emergency Services Contract could be 
taken at a better ‘face value’ than information from less well regulated and checked 
sources, such as social media. However, this section of our discussion also pointed out 
that no data are taken as being perfect, and that all information passed on has its 
limitations understood; for instance while LINZ data is highly accurate, it is only as 
current as when it was last surveyed. In this, XXXX noted that crowdsourced data from 
a temporal view can be very current, but you may need to note it as having potential 
inaccuracies. In general, and importantly, XXXX stressed that any data to be used needs 
to be examined and assessed for its usability. No data are automatically assumed as 
‘good’, and this needs to be communicated to the decision makers or its nature.  
• XXXX was asked if the data available now were sufficient. To this, XXXX noted that 
you will always want the best possible information, particularly with mission critical 
elements, but currently he agrees that there is a good spread of information available to 
this agency. XXXX said that better information can improve the outcomes, but only in 
the complete absence of information does a mission become compromised. 
 
• XXXX defines crowdsourced data as ‘an environment where the general public can 
contribute to a geospatial picture’. Regarding how crowdsourced data has been used by 
GNZ, XXXX references OpenStreetMap (OSM) and how it can provide ‘a picture that 
is different to the picture they can provide’, and it ‘value adds’ to the understanding 
GNZ can provide. OSM has been used for ‘some time’ by GNZ, particularly in overseas 
operations. XXXX noted that, in planning, it can be useful to see differing perspectives 
that try to gain a more complete understanding of the operational area, and the 
crowdsourced platform OSM has been very useful for this from a geospatial point of 
view. In regards to more general intelligence collection, XXXX talks to the role of 
social media in informing understanding. Specifically, XXXX refers to cases where 
information from social media or news media discusses elements of a disaster that GNZ 
in interested in, such as damage to local infrastructure. These data create both a general 
understanding, and a more specific understanding of issues. As put by XXXX, ‘if there 
are comms, you can guarantee that the media and people will be out there with their 
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phones taking pictures.’ This is information that XXXX views as an integral part of 
response operations. This information, particularly when attached to photographs, acts 
as a form of reconnaissance, and provides some relief in terms of taskings that have 
already been undertaken incidentally.  
• When discussing crowdsourced data and potential limitations or flaws, XXXX noted 
that crowdsourced data are a different type of data from traditional sources of 
information. This is something that ‘needs to be understood’ in its implementation. The 
understanding gained from this, is that as crowdsourced data do not follow a production 
method users are familiar with – such as a single author with quality control measures 
in place – there will be a learning curve to understanding how crowdsourced data can 
be used, where can it be used well, and where will it experience issues.  
• XXXX noted that the potential issues around crowdsourced data – errors and 
inaccuracies – are largely not considered to be a problem for GNZ. XXXX said that as 
GNZ looks at larger scale information such as access to infrastructure (water, sewage, 
and power), individual reports are not as much of a concern. This XXXX attributes to 
two factors; the first being the level of verification that any data to be used goes through 
which would highlight any issues; and the second is that at the scale being examined 
(area patterns), individual incorrect features or reports will not impact the overall 
picture, which is their goal.  
• XXXX spoke positively towards the future of crowdsourcing within not just GNZ, but 
more generally for how crowdsourcing will play a greater role in GIS in general. XXXX 
spoke of how military efforts to map the world have been conducted for as long as there 
were militaries to map with. However, with the advent of crowdsourcing, the potential 
for many people to be acting in place of what would be traditional activities, such as 
surveying an area for damage, can now potentially be undertaken by people already 
doing so. People do this currently by documenting the world around them, through 
either social media posts or more deliberate efforts. The potential for providing current, 
up to date information (‘although a different type of information that needs to be 
understood’) is huge. From our conversation, it would seem that it is a matter of people 
utilising this new resource and viewing it as a potential source for providing 
understanding of a disaster situation.  
• Additional to the utilisation of social medial for understanding a situation, XXXX also 
envisions the power of crowdsourced processing. Specifically, XXXX spoke of the idea 
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of immersive capture of a disaster space, rather than feature specific capture. The idea 
of this method of data collection is that through a cloud based crowdsourcing campaign, 
you can work through massive amounts of data to find these features of interest. This 
approach is in reverse and has the distance advantage of being able to identify 
potentially more features of interest. XXXX did reference a notable turning point in the 
acceptance of crowdsourced data as a potential method of understanding our world. 
This was the ‘emotional acceptance of OpenStreetMap; emotional acceptance as a way 
of saying this is something we cannot ignore and must embrace’. This acceptance is 
key to allowing people access to contribute in such a manner. 
• When discussing interactions outside of GNZ, XXXX explained that being a 
Government agency, and one that operates within a secure classified environment, there 
are some limitations to access or sharing of systems. Regarding disaster response 
operations however, and particularly in a domestic context, this is largely conducted in 
an unclassified environment as there is such a high degree of cooperation between GNZ 
and outside agencies. This cooperation has not extended as much to volunteer groups 
that tend to form during disasters to collect and process information, although these 
have not been seen widely by GNZ in their work, as they mainly deal with CDEM and 
Government. Regarding this, XXXX noted that technology and people, as evidenced 
by OpenStreetMap, will become more prevalent, regardless of GNZ’s position. As 
such, he views increased engagement with this element of data collection as being an 
important step in the future of disaster response. Specifics on how future 
implementation of crowdsourced data and groups of volunteers would work were not 
given, as this is still a new topic within the disaster response sphere.  
Themes: 
• Considerable cooperation between agencies. 
• Existing use of reputable source of crowdsourced data, OpenStreetMap. 
• Favourable view towards crowdsourcing in future applications. 
• Issues with perceived crowdsourced issues not relevant for NZDF due to wider focus. 
• Existing datasets sufficient for baseline* data in New Zealand. 
• Advocated for the value of immersive (widespread) capture of crowdsourced data. 
• NZDF focuses on situational awareness over specific incident management. 
*Baseline refers to foundation datasets such as infrastructure and demographics.  
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Interview 2: XXXX, Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group 
(CCDEM), 22nd August 2017 
Method of interview: Zoom teleconference  
• XXXX is the XXXX of Canterbury Civil Defence Management (CCDEM), the 
Canterbury region’s branch of CDEM. The work XXXX does is planning for CCDEM 
during the readiness phase of disaster response work. This makes XXXX a suitable 
informant, as XXXX is very familiar with disaster response work, particularly as it 
applies to working with and communicating critical information between different 
agencies in Canterbury. Additionally, XXXX is currently working on developing tools 
to be used in an EOC; a significant component of this is in tracking events and reports 
during a disaster. During a disaster, XXXX operates within the intelligence and 
planning function, making XXXX qualified to respond to these questions. Further, 
during the course of XXXX tenure, XXXX has been involved in numerous activations, 
including the Port Hill Fires (a large forest fire in the Christchurch City area known as 
the Port Hills, 2017), and the Kaikōura Earthquake (a 7.8 Mw earthquake in November 
2016). 
• CCDEM is responsible for both preparation and direct action related to disasters in the 
Canterbury region. They are the formal government arm of disaster response in 
Canterbury, and have associated powers including the ability to declare an emergency 
for the region. Functionally speaking, they set up and operate EOCs during disasters 
where all agencies meet to liaise and plan for tasks and actions to be conducted. This is 
facilitated by duty officers, of which XXXX is one, who are on call to respond to any 
disasters as they occur, or with early warning from sensors where this is possible.  
• CDEM deals with emergency management using the 4 Rs (Reduction, Readiness, 
Response and Recovery). As such, the requirements for data change between the 
different stages, however when it comes to spatial data, this is primarily during the 
response and recovery phases. Reduction and Readiness are primarily concerned with 
identifying hazards and potential scenarios for harm during a natural event. As such, 
the ownership of these data lies with local authorities to plan for their own areas. During 
the response phase, CCDEM is primarily focused on responding to direct issues arising 
from a natural event. During this phase, the ownership of data, and therefore decisions 
made from the data, falls to the authorities with a civil defence mandate; primarily 
CDEM, but also emergency services and Government Ministries and Departments. 
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Response is characterised by the use of Coordinated Incident Management Systems 
(CIMS). A system that uses spatial and other data sources to identify areas of need for 
ground teams to deal with. Response activities are also time sensitive, and as such, data 
which are current has a high value. The Recovery phase is about returning communities 
to what XXXX terms as a “new normal”. This is based on strategic planning to redesign 
communities to be more resilient in the future, and to help people get back to their 
everyday lives. As such this data falls back to local authorities with support from the 
government.  
• XXXX went on to explain about the relationship between CDEM and local authorities, 
as it relates to disasters. Specifically XXXX explained that local authorities are 
responsible for incidents in their area, as well as planning; the uses of data that this 
study would be concerned with. If an event has a significant enough impact, then 
CDEM can be activated at a regional level, then a national level, at which point this 
information flow includes them. As such, the statements above can change depending 
on the scale and the specific disaster, but in general; Readiness is about identifying 
areas of vulnerability; Response is about incident identification; and Recovery is about 
planning for a long term return to a ‘new normal’.  
• From a technological perspective, XXXX discussed the utilisation of ESRI products to 
work towards a future goal of having maps, and information resources to support a 
response plan. This would integrate data from various sources so that in the event of a 
disaster – or as a tool for planning – a better understanding of the situation on the ground 
can be easily accessed. For example, XXXX has been working on the Canterbury 
Tsunami response plan. Within this response plan, XXXX has been looking at 
developing a GIS web application to store and reflect the information contained in said 
plan. This is so that in the event of a disaster, they will have easy access to all of the 
key pieces of information. These data come from public sources such as Land 
Information New Zealand (LINZ). Looking further into the future is the integration of 
other sources such as lifeline utility information (power systems).  
• When asked about current data being used and its limitations, XXXX said that it is a 
difficult question to answer as it will vary hugely between different disasters. However, 
there is a lot of base line information that will always be used regardless of events; 
roads, powerlines, waterways, property boundaries, etc. These data have been collected 
by CCDEM over a long period of time, however there are issues around the 
85 
 
consolidation of data between individual Territorial Authorities (TA). Additionally, 
some data have been characterised as incomplete, or do not include the specifics that 
are useful for response work; property parcel data can be useful to identify areas where 
people are, however may not include data such as who is living there, or how to contact 
them, as this is determined by the individual TA, and the information that they choose 
to collect. One form of mitigation noted by XXXX is a system implemented by the 
Christchurch TA (the Christchurch City Council, CCC). This was an online registration 
form, from people impacted by the earthquake; a dataset that then was used by the 
CCDEM.  
• Crowdsourcing is defined by XXXX as publicly available information that has been 
collected, and aggregated into what is generally a public website. These data can be 
added by anyone, such as individuals trying to help, or organisations [non-profits] 
trying to help, or as part of the official response. XXXX examples a hypothetical system 
where people could upload geotagged photos. For CCDEM, crowdsourced data have 
not been integrated into responses to date. However, XXXX expressed that this does 
not mean CCDEM does not want to have a ‘public facing tool to submit text, video or 
photo evidence of something’. Ideally, XXXX said this would be beneficial and a 
source of intelligence from volunteered information such as this. This tool has not been 
created to date, nor has it gone through the process of figuring out how it would fit into 
a current EOC structure. 
• When XXXX was asked when believed that this may be integrated into CCDEM, 
XXXX noted that the technology for crowdsourcing has been around for at least a 
decade. XXXX went on to say that from a technical standpoint, crowdsourcing in New 
Zealand by CCDEM can be done currently, and already has been to a lesser extent. 
Specifically, XXXX references a public photo viewer set up by Eagle Technology for 
the Edgecumbe Flooding (April 2017). However, while this has been set up, the 
associated technical arrangements, such as training, and intelligence personnel to 
process the information has not be arranged. From a single event perspective, CCDEM 
is currently able to, within a few hours of an event, set up some form of basic 
crowdsourcing. From a more established perspective with crowdsourcing technologies 
being integrated into future response operations, this is still potentially some time away 
(interpreted as a few years at least from descriptions of system integration and how long 
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that takes). It is something that is desired, but the path to get to there has yet to be 
decided.  
• In terms of how to integrate crowdsourced data into New Zealand disaster response, 
XXXX discussed the EQNZ website; how it developed, and how that can be compared 
to findings from crowdsourced data workshops (as part of US Disaster Relief Camps) 
held out of Camp Robertson in the United States. Specifically, XXXX explained the 
EQNZ website that was established in response to the Christchurch earthquake. This 
goes against the lessons learned from crowdsourced data workshops, which suggest that 
pre-established connections between volunteer individuals and groups, and the agencies 
who use these data during a disaster, would improve the outcomes of this kind of 
activity.  
• A lesson learned though the camps mentioned above include where issues can arise 
from lack of communication between the people setting up crowdsourced data 
collections, and response agencies. Specifically, XXXX mentions that unless the 
generators of crowdsourced data understand the systems in which the data are going to 
be used, then they may be trying to fulfil a need that is already being satisfied elsewhere. 
To this end, XXXX saw less of an issue with the data created, and more of an issue as 
how that data relates to other information that is also being collected. This, XXXX says, 
can be mitigated by forming relationships with the people and groups interested in 
producing this kind of information. 
• Regarding the specific information that is incorrect, CCDEM has had experience with 
this through social media already. XXXX notes that, usually, it is not incorrect 
information so much as it is misunderstood information. Another way in which XXXX 
explains this is that, often, the issues are around public posts of an “issue” that has in 
fact already been dealt with, or is in fact not actually an issue at all. This results in 
wasted resources through reassuring the public and correcting the information. XXXX 
notes that if there was a system for this information that was already used, then these 
issues could be handled before they have the potential to misinform the public.  
• The next steps for CCDEM are to examine how a crowdsourced data application or 
system can be integrated into CCDEM processes. This involves examining how 
existing technologies can be most effectively used (in terms of cost) as well as 
understanding how they would fit within the relationships between stakeholders. This, 
naturally, would also involve engaging with groups and individuals that are interested 
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in volunteer crowdsourcing. As stated before, XXXX believes that close engagement 
with both the public, and potential crowdsources, is the best way, moving forwards, to 
having this in the future.  
Themes:  
• Information requirements vary between the different stages of the response cycle. 
• Crowdsourced data through geotagged photos highlighted as a useful source. 
• A crowdsourced platform is desired but not currently widespread within CDEM. 
• Issues in consolidating data from TAs to a CDEM regional EOC.  
• Crowdsourcing in unstructured ways can lead to inefficiencies and doubling up of work. 
• CDEM is capable at this point in setting up a basic crowdsourcing platform in response 
to a disaster. 
• Social media is the primary method of crowdsourcing. 
 
Interview 3: XXXX, Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group 
(CCDEM), 22nd August 2017 
Method of interview: Zoom teleconference  
• XXXX being CCDEM’s XXXX, looks after the local team in their Christchurch HQ. 
During an event, XXXX is responsible for supervising all the EOC/ECC staff and to, 
‘help the controller achieve their objectives they set out to respond to [an] emergency’. 
This gives XXXX a very direct involvement with decisions made within an EOC 
environment, and how tasks to be completed and the intelligence available interconnect. 
• As with Interview 2, confirmation of previous points. XXXX also mentioned that in his 
role the tasks on the ground are his focus. 
• In XXXX role, XXXX, being task orientated, views information in relation to what 
XXXX team needs to know in order to achieve their goals. To this end, within the flow 
of information, XXXX will engage within XXXX team and task people with gathering 
information to facilitate planning and making decisions around tasks. This involves 
working with GIS operators, and can include tasks such as creating maps, or producing 
statistics around a disaster. To accomplish this, data are drawn from internal sources 
such as the Canterbury council map database, and from external sources, such as partner 
agencies and the local councils who are affected (within the interagency network 
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mentioned in Interview 2). There is also an element of crowdsourced information that 
is generated from the Public Information Managers who monitor social media, and who 
will sometimes pass on individual posts or provide reports on trends in the data. 
• The data that are most valuable for the work XXXX does are reports concerning 
elements which civil defence teams can address. These data then, outside of a general 
understanding such as roads and properties, is information that helps create a picture of 
the situation on the ground. This is information about areas, streets and potentially 
houses impacted by a natural event. Additionally, this information is set beside event 
specific information, rainfall and low-lying areas in flooding, forested areas with 
housing in fires, displaced peoples, etc. Information of this nature can be then used to 
respond, and is also aggregated into situation reports that go to the government. 
• In terms of data limitations, similar to XXXX’s remarks, XXXX notes that data are 
generated by aggregation through the different levels of government. This extends from 
the TA level, who are responsible for collecting information on people, property and 
infrastructure in this local areas, and up through regional authorities to a national level. 
In this, XXXX notes that the issue is that it is reliant on a large amount of manual 
collection and processing of data, and for local TAs to have collected all of the relevant 
information before a disaster occurs. This is particularly problematic, as XXXX also 
notes that in Canterbury, each TA has their own systems and policies, which makes the 
regional information strategy more difficult from a funding point of view. 
• XXXX believes that electronic platforms should be being used more, not only to help 
individual people understand what is happening, but also to contribute information 
about how they need help. XXXX implies that this form of crowdsourcing for disaster 
response would be an effective method, particularly if these data can be aggregated to 
understand the bigger picture. When asked for examples, XXXX spoke of the use of 
geotagged photos to identify issues. Additionally, citizen based reporting could help 
identify problems, with those photos allowing for validation remotely. 
• Advocating for the advantage that a human factor brings to data from crowdsourcing, 
XXXX uses an example where technical systems generated information that was 
misused. This was during the 2011 Christchurch earthquake when CCDEM realised 
that there were areas without working sewerage. In response, a plan was enacted to 
deliver port-a-loos to those houses affected, only to discover that those houses had also 
been abandoned by their occupants. This event happened because of systems not being 
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connected, and XXXX believes that with crowdsourcing, there is the ability for a 
common sense approach that would have information for councils come with caveats 
such as, “we have no working toilets but we also are not living there”. 
• XXXX mentions that XXXX has seen councils getting better at using websites such as 
Survey123 to collect information. This happens either in the form of staff members 
doing door-to-door surveys in affected areas, or by people voluntarily filling out these 
surveys to communicate how they have been affected themselves. This was seen in the 
Edgecumbe Floods, and during the Kaikōura Earthquake, with the then New Zealand 
Fire Service and their Urban Search and Rescue Teams using Survey123 for rapid 
building assessment. That data were then applied very quickly as a layer in a GIS, 
meaning that each property could be searched and its status displayed, or the data 
aggregated to see patterns. This same technology has the potential to be applied to 
public engagement for crowdsourcing. At this point in time however, CCDEM has not 
engaged with this technology. XXXX also notes that the implementation should be 
directed at a national level to ensure consistency in process and information. 
• When talking about a hypothetical national level crowdsourcing system or campaign, 
XXXX mentioned the scale of information to be collected as a potential problem. 
Specifically, XXXX notes that during a disaster, it will be an even greater amount of 
information to work through, although it would be considerably more valuable, as it is 
also real-time, and therefore current. This would, however, result in an increase to 
labour or technical pressure that is currently not part of CCDEM workflow. 
As with XXXX’s interview, the next step for CCDEM is to look at how a public 
engagement forum such as Survey123, or a custom web service, can be integrated into 
the CCDEM systems. XXXX, however, holds the view that crowdsourcing, to be as 
effective as it can be, should be implemented at a national level; this would ensure 
consistency.  
• XXXX notes the value of engaging with the public through crowdsourcing, as it helps 
them understand the situation, and brings both piece of mind, and information to all 
parties. In regards to working with crowdsourcing groups, this was not discussed as 
much as in previous interviews, as the focus was on creating that public engagement 




• The highest value data is information around where people are in need (temporal 
importance). 
• Issues in consolidating data from TAs to a CDEM regional EOC. 
• Almost all information is useful for creation situational awareness. 
• Crowdsourced data through geotagged photos highlighted as a useful source. 
• Crowdsourcing provides a level of detail and common sense that is missed in purely 
technical systems. 
• Crowdsourcing to be effective needs to be implemented at a national scale to ensure 
consistency. 
• The current CDEM systems are not designed to handle the large amount of changing 
data in a crowdsourced collection. 
• Collaboration with volunteer crowdsourced groups essential for positive outcomes. 
• Use of online surveys to crowdsourced viewed as a next step. 
• Social media is the primary method of crowdsourcing. 
 
Interview 4: XXXX, Emergency Management Otago, 24th August 2017 
Method of interview: Zoom teleconference  
• XXXX as the Dunedin XXXX is responsible for XXXX Dunedin City Council’s 
response team. In this role, XXXX is involved in decision making and working directly 
with the Incident Controller (a Council-appointed senior executive) to help them 
understand the processes around disaster response systems. This experience extends to 
an understanding of what is needed, both from a response team perspective, and also 
from an intelligence requirements perspective. 
• XXXX works at the TA level for Dunedin, meaning that XXXX has a good 
understanding of how information flows can impact the response operations in a very 
direct manner. As with other CDEM organisations, the Dunedin team functions in the 
same EOC manner.  
• Working at the TA level, XXXX talks about information about Dunedin that will 
impact response operations. This information needs to have a high level of detail, as 
every step of a response operation in Dunedin goes through the Dunedin Controller, 
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and therefore XXXX. In this interview, XXXX outlined the information requirements 
for a disaster response operation as including the following: 
o Natural Hazard vulnerabilities – relief that can impact flooding, isolated areas, 
weather patterns. 
o Key infrastructure to the city – Power, water and communications; emergency 
service facilities, civil defence facilities, roading and transportation.  
o Contact information for key infrastructure. 
• The information that is already within the system is generally uploaded to a council-
owned GIS system that can be used by different agencies during a disaster. XXXX says 
that the purpose of this is to facilitate the decision making process by centralising this 
information.  
• To source this information, XXXX uses existing databases that council has, but also 
through collaboration with other organisations; the Otago Regional Council has hazard 
risk information that goes into this system, and local utility companies provide data on 
key infrastructure that may be needed during a disaster. When asked about possible 
improvements to the data, XXXX said that the data are always being refined, 
particularly as policies change over time. For example, 10 years ago, a policy changed, 
and local primary schools were predesignated as civil defence locations. This policy 
changed 5 years after that to be whatever structure is suitable on the day. In either 
instance, the data requirements for the council response team changed, and so did the 
dataset identifying potential locations. The council GIS system is, in this sense, a 
constantly improving system.  
• The strengths of this system, XXXX says, lie in the strong base of useful information 
from the variety of layers available. For example, identification of potential hazard 
areas, and matching that with any other data available, is made possible by this system. 
However, this system presents with a notable weakness that when it comes to data 
during a disaster, particularly when narrowing it down from areas that are potentially 
threatened to areas currently impacted by a disaster. This information, naturally, cannot 
exist before a disaster. To source this information during a disaster, field reconnaissance 
teams will report back on the situation on the ground, and this can be used to further 
narrow down areas from potentially threatened to actually threaten. However, these 
teams are limited by council resources, and while modern technology means that this 
communication is fairly instant, the teams can still only report on what is directly in 
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front of them. This means that the speed of information is limited not by technology, 
but by the level of the council team’s presence on the ground.  
• An interesting observation from XXXX is that even information from council teams 
can have issues. For example, a report of a street needing evacuation, because of heavy 
surface road flooding, may actually not fully represent the complete picture of how that 
flooding has impacted the residents of that street. In the example given, XXXX says 
that while it may appear that a street needs evacuation from the road, the houses 
themselves may not have had habitable living space compromised, and that information 
requires a more in-depth investigation to find out. This relates back to the issues around 
both time, and personnel resources in all disaster events.  
• One element of information XXXX discusses is public understanding; what 
information the general public has regarding a disaster, and how they are getting this 
information. One example of this was a notification of a water contamination issue by 
the Dunedin City Council (DCC). This issue was related to the reservoir supply and the 
need to test for a mild form of contamination. The public perception however, 
facilitated by rumour and speculation on social media, was that it was a 1080 poison 
contamination. While this was easily fixed by sharing the correct information through 
social media and official channels, it does highlight the need to understand the public 
perception of the information they are receiving. This is particularly so when that 
information is not coming from official sources. This has relevance to crowdsourcing, 
in that some systems of crowdsourcing allow people to share not just with response 
agencies, but also with each other. This has the potential to be a source of information 
for Mr. Mitchell’s council team, as well as a source of misinformation for the public.  
• When asked about what XXXX definition of crowdsourcing was, XXXX said that it 
was ‘instant access to untested information, generally from the public, in relation to a 
given event’. At present, the Dunedin team is engaging with the social media side of 
crowdsourced data. This is done though their social media team, which is set up in 
response to events. XXXX opinion on this particular source is that, with specific 
reference to Facebook, social media provides instant information about people 
impacted by a disaster, however this information is unverified. The unverified nature, 
he notes, limits what actions can be taken from the data gained. Unsolicited information 
is also gained through people contacting the council to report issues. However, this is 
generally discouraged, as Council prefers to have people contact emergency services 
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for issues that are an imminent threat, or to contact utility providers when applicable, 
as they are more able to resolve issues related to their business. 
• When the team does use crowdsourced data, particularly from social media, the 
information is not taken at face value. As such, they will often look for corroborating 
data, and provide a “measured response”. XXXX provides an example of where this 
happened during a disaster in the June (2015) floods: ‘As the operations centre was 
winding down for the night, a message popped up on Facebook about a slip threatening 
a house. This caused concern, and we were very quickly able to identify the location 
and get in touch with the property owner, and ascertain that the slip had occurred three 
days ago and had been addressed. So, it does raise some concerns around what level of 
response you would give to an image or a post on social media’. This highlights the 
heightened awareness the Dunedin team has around misinformation on crowdsourced 
platforms.  
• During our discussion, the idea of the method of information sharing having an 
association with its trustworthiness. Specifically, XXXX noted that information 
provided directly by the public through a phone call is usually viewed favourably in 
terms of trust in the information provided. The reason for this is that for someone to 
provide said information through a phone call requires a considerable amount of effort 
on their part; waiting for someone to answer, and  then being redirected to a person to 
talk to. Additionally, any information that they do provide is immediately associated 
with their phone number, and presumably them as a person. These two factors mean 
that information from a phone call is generally considered to be less prone to contain 
misinformation, or at least intentional misinformation. The inverse of this is the team’s 
interactions with crowdsourced data through social media, which are more prone to 
opinions or information from those less informed, similar to posts about 1080 in the 
water, as mentioned previously.   
• Future plans for crowdsourcing are generally on hold for the Dunedin team. The reason 
for this is that other CDEM teams are currently working through this question and 
developing crowdsourced platforms. Specifically, Mr. Mitchell mentions the work 
being done by XXXX at Emergency Management Southland, who is developing a 
crowdsourced application for the people of that region. 
• When asked about how the Dunedin team would be able to work with outside 
crowdsources, XXXX said that a collaboration would be considered. However, he is 
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not sure of how readily it would be adopted during a disaster as ‘realistically [the 
Dunedin team] are only starting to mature ourselves in terms of our intelligence 
processes’. XXXX says this in the framed example of a group with Ushahidi crisis 
mappers creating a complex and highly detailed crowdsourced dataset, a dataset that 
may be outside of the current scope of Dunedin’s intelligence team to process. 
Additionally there is another factor, particularly for social media, in that crowdsourcing 
requires two way communication. This means that anyone involved in collecting data 
would need to be familiar with the systems used and to be directly connected to the 
operations centre for live problem solving.  
Themes: 
• The highest value data is information around where people are in need (temporal 
importance). 
• Almost all information is useful for creation situational awareness. 
• Crowdsourced data through geotagged photos highlighted as a useful source. 
• Crowdsourcing is still a new field and Civil Defence is in the early stages of utilising 
it. 
• Crowdsourcing needs to be two way communication to address issues as they arise. 
• Social media is the primary method of crowdsourcing. 
 
Interview 5: XXXX, New Zealand Red Cross, 28th August 2017 
Method of interview: Zoom teleconference  
• XXXX is one of the XXXX of the NZRC. In this role, XXXX is part of the policy 
decision making process. XXXX has also spent several years inside of NZRC’s Disaster 
Welfare Support Teams (DWST) giving XXXX an understanding of NZRC’s 
capabilities. Importantly, XXXX does specify that he is not involved as much in the 
technical aspects of NZRC’s use of geospatial technology.  
• NZRC as put by XXXX; ‘NZRC has a number of guiding principles, but it is all based 
in the mission to improve the lives of vulnerable people, and mobilise the power of 
humanity. As part of that, we have arrangements with the [New Zealand] Government 
through our auxiliary status as a provider of support during a disaster; something which 
we have a remit to do internationally as Red Cross. This means that the NZRC is 
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included as part of emergency management and disaster response plans under CDEM 
as a responding organisation with civil defence powers in an emergency. Additionally, 
as an organisation independent of the New Zealand Government, NZRC has the ability 
to self-activate to respond to natural disasters in which people may experience 
suffering.  
• From a technical GIS and intelligence standpoint, which XXXX does stress he is not 
an expert on, NZRC typically has a limited function. XXXX attributes this to their core 
objective of alleviating the suffering of people in need, and the existence of CDEM 
planning and intelligence inside of the EOC systems they work within. As such, from 
XXXX’s experience, NZRC teams in New Zealand are primarily end users of 
information that is produced from CDEM. An important caveat on this statement is that 
this applies during the response phase when NZRC is integrated into a CIMS structure, 
and takes the role of a responding agency similar to emergency services. During the 
recovery phase, NZRC takes on a different role, and this stage does change their 
approach to intelligence and information collection, particularly regarding the 
measuring of the impact of support to communities. 
• Information requirements of the NZRC differ drastically between Response and 
Recovery phases. The reason for this difference is that between the Response and 
Recovery phases, the activities undertaken are completely different. During the 
Response phase, NZRC teams are part of CIMS as a response agency, and conduct 
activities such as welfare centres, light search and rescue, delivery of aid, evacuation of 
impacted people, and other activities CDEM requires an agency to facilitate. This 
changes significantly during a Recovery phase when NZRC becomes more self-
directed, and guided by internal management and the mandate to alleviate suffering. 
The following section is divided into Response and Recovery: 
• Response: NZRC collects information from its outreach processes (door knocking) that 
is then used to supplement their understanding of where people need help. This is 
supported by registration systems in NZRC welfare centres, which during the 2011 
Christchurch earthquake were manually entered initially into spreadsheets, and later 
into basic GIS formats. This information was used to add to the reports and updates 
produced by CDEM in the EOC, with this information being part of those reports.  
• Recovery: The Recovery phase uses the same sources of information as the Response 
phase to assess areas of need. However, XXXX noted that within the long term 
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approach of recovery, particularly for the primary case study of Christchurch, additional 
data sources were sought to better understand the impact they had on communities. 
These data sources came from extended community outreach beyond the response 
phase of the disaster. Additionally, “comprehensive” surveys were used as part of this 
approach, an element that XXXX believes the NZRC excels at.  
• On the subject of crowdsourcing, XXXX said that it is not a large focus of the NZRC, 
and attributes this to the idea that people most vulnerable – those that the NZRC focus 
on – often will not have access to the technological systems most crowdsourcing takes 
place through. This is not to say that people are unable to access social media or 
crowdsourcing websites under normal conditions, but instead to say that during a 
disaster, those worst affected may not have access to power, cell tower signal, or the 
means to travel to a place to ask for help. Effectively, the people the NZRC will focus 
on, are those who are the worst impacted by a natural event.  
• XXXX reinforced that in the context of the work NZRC does, crowdsourcing carries 
the perceived risk of collecting information not reflective of those most vulnerable. For 
example, XXXX mentions that when making decisions around the spending of recovery 
funds, they needed to ensure it was going to those in the most need. From that 
perspective, crowdsourcing information on who has been impacted could mean that the 
focus turned to those with access to contribute to the crowdsourcing, to the exclusion 
of some who may be even worse off to the point of not having mechanisms to contribute 
at all. By using NZRC surveys, they could ensure all areas were equally represented to 
collect this information.  
• NZRC, as of 2017, is trialling a system called Magpi for field data collection. This is, 
in essence, a mobile application which has premade – ideally by a user in the EOC – 
survey forms that can be geotagged. The forms, completed by field teams interviewing 
residents in an affected area, are then uploaded to a central GIS that displays the 
information live at an EOC. This is not strictly crowdsourcing as it involves using a 
professional to ask and record information, but the technology involved is similar to 
that of crowdsourced applications. This does, however, represent an increase in the 
speed of data collection from people in an affected area, to the decision makers. 
• Additionally to the implementation of Magpi, NZRC is also looking at the 
implementation of a GIS/incident management system that is currently deployed by the 
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). This 
97 
 
system is called the RMS (Resource Management System), and is a GIS system 
deployed by the IFRC to local branches to give them the capability to visualise where 
branch members are located in a disaster area. It has not been used in New Zealand yet, 
as it is still being investigated by NZRC for its usability.  
• Looking towards the future, XXXX does see a future of crowdsourced for response 
operations, however generally cautions against information being used in disaster 
response that is not verified. 
• On the subject of community engagement, XXXX spoke about NZRC’s deep ties to 
communities. He said that with NZRC members being part of communities across New 
Zealand, when disasters occur, Disaster Welfare Support teams (DWST) are often 
engaging with communities before the government can even declare an emergency. 
This puts NZRC in a position where they are able to engage with grass root community 
groups where they form.  
Themes: 
• The primary method of collection is field surveys through response teams. 
• Information is generally acquired through CIMS (and therefore CDEM). 
• Crowdsourced data carries the risk of excluding those most vulnerable. 
 
Interview 6: XXXX, GNZ, 28th August 2017 
Method of interview: Zoom teleconference  
• XXXX is the XXXX for GNZ. XXXX is responsible for foundation production 
(topographic, aeronautical, and maritime data sets). From a disaster response 
perspective, XXXX is involved in data acquisition for GNZ efforts. This gives XXXX 
an in-depth understanding of what processes are involved in data acquisition, and how 
crowdsourced data could potentially fit into GNZ processes.  
• XXXX notes that at this stage both the technologies for quickly sharing data, as well as 
high quality foundation data exist. This, XXXX believes, has improved disaster 
response operations to move more quickly and act on new data more effectively.  
• XXXX defines crowdsourced data as users from a range of backgrounds coming 
together to provide information about the world. In regards to GNZ response, 
OpenStreetMap has been used in conjunction with other sources of data. Additionally, 
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XXXX notes the value of social media and traditional news media as a ‘very useful 
source of context and a gauge of the severity of an event’. Crowdsourced data in GNZ 
are characterised as data which are used to provide context and situational awareness. 
Importantly, the data are not used in isolation.  
• In support of Crowdsourcing being used by GNZ is a held attitude that new sources of 
information are regularly investigated for usability. This is with the caveat, however, 
that new sources from unknown producers need to be validated before they can be used 
in a decision making process. Furthermore, XXXX said that decision makers will 
naturally gravitate to where the information they are looking for is available. This 
means that crowdsourced data, as it becomes more common-place, is going to be part 
of future operations  
• During our discussion, the topic of variation in information provided by individuals 
came up. To this end, XXXX noted that individual perceptions can influence the nature 
of the information received. For example, if asked “how much water do you have left?” 
this could be answered in a variety of ways; depending on a person’s background they 
may take more conservative or liberal estimates, which can lead to a poor quality of 
information for decisions around resource allocation.   
• When asked about future use of crowdsourced data, XXXX noted the importance of 
this as a growing field. To this end he believes that crowdsourced data will continue to 
be used, however the exact nature of the future of crowdsourced data in GNZ remains 
unclear. Additionally, GNZ has done some testing of mobile apps and their applicability 
to GNZ operations. To this end, it has not been done with crowdsourcing specifically 
in mind, however this is certainly a possibility (conditional on policy).  
• Regarding developing relationships with other groups, XXXX spoke of the ongoing 
efforts by GNZ to develop good connections in this area. XXXX said that while GNZ 
has good working relationships with other agencies in New Zealand, this work is an 
ongoing process. This is relevant, as during a disaster, organisations are not acting 
alone, and the sharing of information and methods is the best way to achieve results. 
This work does have policy challenges, as working in a live environment is more 
complex, but these are ‘not insurmountable’.  
• Finally, XXXX noted that while he was not aware of any specific occasions where GNZ 
created a relationship with a crowdsourcing group, there have been local engagements 
of a crowdsourced nature. The engagements XXXX refers to are situations where 
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NZDF personnel will interact with local populations to find out information, and use 
that information for situational awareness. Therefore, the principle of engaging with the 
public to gain an understanding of the situation on the ground is not a new concept. For 
this reason, XXXX believes that a more technologically-based form of engagement, 
such as crowdsourced apps, have considerable potential.  
Themes: 
• Working between response agencies is a focus of future policy. 
• Existing use of reputable source of crowdsourced data, OpenStreetMap. 
• Crowdsourcing viewed as essential to future disaster response efforts. 
• Issues of accuracy of crowdsourced data not as much of a concern as it is used for either 
situational awareness of confirmation of other information. 
• NZDF focuses on situational awareness over specific incident management. 
 
Interview 7: XXXX , Ngāi Tahu, 11th September 2017 
Method of interview: Zoom teleconference  
• XXXX is XXXX for Ngāi Tahu. Within this department disaster recovery and response 
is part of this. XXXX work spans across the four Rs, and he is a policy maker. This 
puts XXXX in a position to comment on Ngāi Tahu’s involvement in disasters within 
areas the Iwi has members.  
• Ngāi Tahu is a Statutory Partner in the recovery of the 2011 Christchurch Earthquake, 
along with the three local TAs impacted, and led by CERA (Christchurch Earthquake 
Recovery Authority). Being a statutory partner, this came with responsibilities in the 
recovery effort, as well as some powers afforded under CERA legislation. This is in 
addition to direct and indirect support to members of the Iwi impacted by the disaster, 
through support of local business, and grants, or working with NGOs. 
• XXXX noted that in the first instance of a disaster, being able to contact people is of a 
very high priority. Knowing where community members live, and their contact 
numbers, becomes very important, especially if you also know that the area where they 
live has been impacted by a natural event. Uniquely, this is something which Ngāi Tahu 
– through their GIS team – have; registrars for Iwi members. This has allowed for very 
quick contact during natural events. XXXX estimates that around 10% of member 
100 
 
addresses are known currently. The system in question had been in place pre-2011, but 
underwent a major overhaul after the 2011 earthquakes. These data have been collected 
directly by Ngāi Tahu.  
• To collect information during disasters, Ngāi Tahu conducted field surveys in a similar 
fashion to CDEM and the NZRC. After disasters, a more open forum has been used in 
terms of community engagement; community meetings. In general however, Ngāi 
Tahu, from this interview, has not focused on crowdsourced data in terms of disaster 
management. This is because the focus of Ngāi Tahu is to assist Iwi members, and this 
has been done through community connections.  
• An element of crowdsourced data, XXXX notes, is that when it comes directly from 
the community, it is unfiltered. In his opinion, when looking at information to respond 
to disasters and help communities, unfiltered information can prevent bias or ‘spin’ 
being placed on information flows. This is viewed positively.  
• Crowdsourcing is not a large focus for Ngāi Tahu outside of direct community 
engagement. 
• One element which was spoken about in great length, was the ways in which Ngāi Tahu 
engages with its community. Internal connections within the tribe have allowed for a 
good understanding of the conditions members were living in after the earthquake. This 
was supported by surveys being conducted to gather information. Following this 
information gathering process JAGs (Joint Action Groups) were set up. These were set 
up as both a planning committee, and as a form of community engagement ensuring 
that local communities had input into the plans created. This local engagement would 
be done through Kaitokou* (team surveyors), sometimes assisted by NGOs. 
Themes: 
• Internal collection of member databases creates a strong foundation for post disaster 
assessment of damage and harm. 
• Door to door surveys are used in place of other methods of data collection. 
• Social Media is used to understand the situation, however that is the extent to which 
crowdsourced data is used for community wellbeing.  





Interview 8: XXXX, GNZ, 12th September 2017 
Method of interview: Zoom Teleconference 
• XXXX is a data manager for GNZ and as such is very familiar with data sources and 
has personal experience with crowdsourcing theory. Specifically with involvement with 
a group called MapAction, which is a network for geospatial professionals working in 
disaster response.  
• In addition to what was mentioned by other GNZ employees XXXX emphasised how 
working within a secure data system means that where the information comes from 
needs to be considered. This is for security as well as reliability reasons. This challenge 
is overcome somewhat by working within CDEM networks which are unclassified. 
This was exemplified in the case of the 2016 Kaikōura earthquakes where NZDF 
personnel found difficulties connecting back to GNZ with information as it was done 
under a civilian information network set up by CDEM. 
• Adding to XXXX’s explanation of what data is used and the challenges faced, is the 
emphasis on how the South-West Pacific region impacts the work GNZ does. As an 
aside, not necessarily domestic but still engage with by the New Zealand government, 
GNZ finds that OpenStreetMap has been an excellent resource in the South-West 
Pacific where at times data is not as available as in New Zealand. 
• XXXX as a person who has worked with crowdsourced data before is very familiar 
with this data. Interesting they advocated for their teams understanding of 
crowdsourced data to and explained that while it is not used extensively by GNZ 
(related to the role they have, see previous GNZ interviews) it is well understood. 
Regarding how it fits into GNZ data, as data manger XXXX is always open to adding 
new sources of data to the range GNZ uses.  
• An area of interest for XXXX was in the uses of TomNod to analyse imagery (a primary 
source for GNZ). Within GNZ they have trained staff to look through, analyse, and add 
features to imagery. However it is recognised that with any major operation the work 
load can increase beyond normal capacity and crowdsourcing has been effective 
overseas to process this large amount of imagery.  
• The big perceived limitation for crowdsourcing from XXXX’s perspective is that it is 
very difficult to fit within NZDF systems.  
• Regarding the future of crowdsourced data within GNZ XXXX is open to the possibility 
of using CGI in operations but it would have to be of benefit to GNZ. The issue with 
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this is that much of the work GNZ does within an event is not applicable to the type of 
data produced. Where there would be most crossover would be in imagery analysis but 
this is covered well within GNZ.  
• As for relationships with outside groups and GNZ, there is no direct connections. As 
currently the role GNZ has in a disaster does not fit well with crowdsourced data 
produced.  
Themes: 
• GNZ’s secure environment poses challenges for working with crowdsourced data 
• Crowdsourced data will well understood 
• There is no engagement with outside crowdsourced groups 
• Crowdsourced data is not very applicable to GNZ outside of crowdsourced processing 
of imagery but this is currently able to be covered in-house.  
 
 
Interview 9: XXXX, Emergency Management Southland, 13th September 2017 
Method: Zoom Teleconference 
• This interview was conducted between XXXX and YYYY. XXXX is a GIS analyst at 
Emergency Management Southland and YYYY is an emergency management advisor 
at Emergency Management Southland. Emergency Management Southland is the 
CDEM group for the Southland region.  
• The scope of the work conducted by XXXX and YYYY is similar to other regional 
CDEM’s but notably Emergency Management Southland is working towards 
developing a more ‘logic-driven’ intelligence gathering system, finding more effective 
sources of timely information. Crowdsourcing is part of this. 
• Current sources of information from Emergency Management Southland as YYYY 
explains is the same as other CDEM’s however as YYYY explains “there are no 
specific documentation on how to collect intelligence” and they instead work from 
experience and known sources. These are important to disaster response but existing 
sources could be timelier in their data. 
• XXXX and YYYY view crowdsourcing as the general public being able to contribute 
to an event by sharing their observations. This view is heavily reflected in their model 
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for crowdsourcing.  This model is a working prototype of an EOC controlled, web-
based, crowdsourcing platform.  
• When asked about issues around crowdsourcing XXXX explained that many of the 
issues they would anticipant, inaccurate or irrelevant information, have been at least 
partially mitigated through their system. Through the use of ‘dropdown tabs’ and 
verification of major points they can guide information to deliver what is needed by 
responders. 
• The system proposed, and the future of crowdsourcing for Emergency Management 
Southland, is a web-based user interface for Southland residents to contribute during an 
event. The system works through a portal through the Emergency Management website 
and go to an interactive map where they can post a report. Notably this process also 
provides the ability to post images, which YYYY says makes it easy to verify 
information in the tests they have done. The functionality of this crowdsourced system 
includes be ability for EOC users to re-post select information to this map. 
• As for engaging with outside crowdsourcing groups this is viewed positively. Although 
this system has no functionality to allow for crowdsourced processing this is something 
XXXX and YYYY have thought about.  
Themes:  
• Better sources of data should always be sought 
• A system is being tested that is direct crowdsourcing 
o The system has been a success in early tests 
• Systems should be designed around the data needed and good design can mitigate some 





















Appendix E: OpenStreetMap before (top) and after (bottom) 2010 Haiti HOT 




Appendix F: Assessment of effectiveness of crowdsourcing from aerial photography, 
from Ghosh et al. (2011) 
 
